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Major technological advances have recently spurred a new wave of offshoring in services, which used
to be non-tradable. Should service workers in developed countries worry about their jobs? Trade the-
ory has given a nuanced answer to this question, suggesting that efficiency gains from offshoring may
counteract direct job losses, which leaves the predicted net effect ambiguous. This paper investigates
the employment effects of service offshoring in a newly combined and exceptionally detailed panel
dataset, covering almost the entire universe of German firms’ service imports over the years 2002-2013.
It exploits firm-specific export supply shocks by partner countries and service types as an instrumental
variable to find that service offshoring has increased firm employment. In line with the canonical trade
in tasks model, the employment gains are greater in firms with higher initial levels of service offshoring.
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1 Introduction
There is a widespread fear in the developed world that domestic jobs are endangered by offshoring to low-
wage countries. A popular narrative suggests that these anxieties played a decisive role in the US presidential
elections of 2016.1 More generally, the increasing public concern about offshoring is evidenced by the rising
media attention to this topic over time, as documented by Amiti and Wei (2005) and Mankiw and Swagel
(2006) for the UK and the US. In Germany, offshoring has been found to increase job loss fears, particu-
larly among high-skilled workers (Geishecker et al., 2012). These workers may indeed be threatened by a
‘new wave’ of offshoring in services (Bardhan and Kroll, 2003) that has been triggered by groundbreaking
innovations in information and communication technologies (ICT) over the past decades. The spread of
portable computers, broadband internet, and the smartphone has made services tradable globally that could
only be delivered locally before. As a consequence, the share of service trade in world GDP has doubled
from around 3% to 6% between 1985 and 2007.2 Since jobs in the newly tradable commercial services are
typically skill-intensive and high-paying (Jensen, 2008), the question arises: Are these ‘good’ domestic jobs
lost due to service offshoring?
In theory, the employment effects of offshoring are not as clear-cut as one might expect. While the
relocation itself obviously reduces domestic employment, the associated cost savings entail a productivity
effect that can help offshoring firms to expand their output, which ameliorates the job losses and might even
turn them into job creation. The seminal ‘trade in tasks’ model by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008),
formalizing these ideas, has typically been applied to offshoring of manufactured inputs, but similar effects
can be expected for services.3 The ambiguous theoretical predictions call for an empirical investigation into
the employment effects of service offshoring.
The lack of appropriate micro data on service offshoring firms has severely restricted empirical investi-
gations in the past, as establishing causality is difficult at the industry level. Only recently, firm-level data
on service trade have become available and opened the door to a more rigorous causal analysis. Such a firm-
level analysis can build on recent extensions of the trade in tasks model that show how the relocation and
productivity effects of offshoring vary across heterogeneous firms.4 However, the same models also predict
that larger and more productive firms are more active in offshoring, raising an important endogeneity issue
that needs to be addressed empirically.
This paper’s goal is to estimate the causal effects of service offshoring on firm employment in Germany,
the world’s second largest importer of services. Service offshoring is measured by imports of tradable com-
mercial services, reflecting the fact that the relocation of a required service to another country necessarily
entails subsequent imports of that service. The paper builds on an exceptionally detailed panel dataset,
covering almost the entire universe of German firms’ service imports by partner countries and service types
over the period from 2001 to 2013. These data are newly combined with firm-level employment and balance
sheet information for the purpose of this analysis. The resulting firm panel provides an almost comprehen-
1For instance, the political analysis website FiveThirtyEight reports that Donald Trump received substantially more
votes in counties with a higher share of routine jobs, which are potentially threatened by automation or offshoring (see
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trump-was-stronger-where-the-economy-is-weaker/). Autor et al. (2017) stress the impact of
imports from China on the election outcome.
2These numbers are based on service trade data from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and GDP data from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators.
3Note that the early contribution by Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) focused on the offshoring of services, not manufactured
inputs. The beneficial effects of cost savings for domestic labor have been investigated at least since Egger and Falkinger (2003)
and Kohler (2004a,b). In addition to the negative relocation effect and the positive productivity effect, the trade in tasks model
further predicts an ambiguous relative-price effect (see e.g. also Deardorff, 2001a,b).
4See Egger et al. (2015, 2016), Groizard et al. (2014), and Sethupathy (2013).
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sive picture of German service offshoring. I use it to investigate the firm-level employment effects of both
new offshoring (the extensive margin) and changes in the volume of offshoring (the intensive margin). The
analysis at the extensive margin implements a difference-in-differences matching approach, which compares
employment changes in firms that start service offshoring to changes in a matched control group with similar
initial conditions. To investigate the intensive margin, I instrument for service offshoring using firm-specific
export supply shocks by partner countries and service types in fixed effects regressions. This instrumental
variable (IV) strategy follows Hummels et al. (2014), who use it to analyze offshoring of manufactured
inputs by Danish firms. The IV exploits the fact that firms’ importing behavior is highly firm-specific and
stable over time. Holding the initial import mix of a firm constant, the time variation in its partner countries’
exports to the rest of the world by service types is used as a revealed measure of changes in these countries’
comparative advantage. The rationale behind this approach is that a German firm, which initially imports
a given service from a given country, benefits disproportionately from an improvement in this country’s
comparative advantage in this particular service, and can thus expand its offshoring activities. The crucial
assumption of the IV approach is that foreign exports to the rest of the world are uncorrelated with the
German firm’s employment growth, except through offshoring (conditional on the control variables, which
include industry-year fixed effects). Under this exclusion restriction, it serves to identify the causal effect of
service offshoring on firm employment.
The main findings are summarized as follows. Firms that start service offshoring for the first time
experience non-negative employment effects, which are estimated to be small and not significantly different
from the matched control groups in most years. More interestingly, the analysis at the intensive margin
reveals that increased service offshoring has increased domestic employment in German firms over the
years 2002-2013. The estimated elasticity of 5.2-7.6% suggests that this effect is economically sizable, and
the IV approach ensures that the positive effect is not driven by simultaneity or omitted variables. Instead,
the two-stage least squares estimates can be interpreted as evidence for a cost savings effect from offshoring,
which allows firms to expand and hire more workers. In line with this interpretation, service offshoring is
found to boost firm output and total factor productivity. Moreover, the employment gains are greater in
firms with higher initial levels of service offshoring. This pattern is fully in line with the working of the
productivity effect in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and formally predicted by recent extensions of
their model featuring firm heterogeneity (see in particular Egger et al., 2016). Intuitively, if foreign services
become cheaper, the firm can experience cost savings that tend to increase employment. However, these
cost savings are zero for the first offshored worker, as they work only through the infra-marginal units,
which have previously been offshored. Consequently, a firm that has previously offshored more services
experiences greater cost savings, and hence more favorable employment effects. These predictions are
borne out strongly in the data, suggesting that service offshoring entails substantial productivity effects that
benefit domestic employment.
The analysis proceeds by digging deeper into the rich micro data to shed some light on three inter-
esting features of the employment effects at the intensive margin of service offshoring. First, one might
suspect that service imports reflect not only services that were previously conducted by the firm itself, but
also those purchased from other German suppliers prior to offshoring. However, sample splits show that
the employment effects are even more favorable in the service sector, where the phenomenon of domestic
supplier substitution should be less relevant because firms engage in service activities themselves. Also, the
positive effects are confirmed if service offshoring is measured relative to domestic purchases of services.
These findings suggest that domestic supplier substitution is not of primary relevance. Second, splitting
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up service imports by source country reveals that offshoring to non-OECD countries tends to yield stronger
positive employment effects. This result is in line with the expectation that services provided by low-income
countries are more complementary to domestic employment in German firms in terms of task and skill re-
quirements. Third, since the combined dataset includes information on all sizeable foreign direct investment
(FDI) links of German firms, it can be used to shed some first light on possible differences in the employ-
ment effects between intra-firm and arm’s length service offshoring. The data show that potential intra-firm
service offshoring (to countries and industries where a firm has an FDI link) also entails non-negative em-
ployment effects, but the relevance of this phenomenon is very limited. A set of robustness checks presented
at the end shows that the positive employment effects of increased service offshoring are confirmed when
(i) accounting for possible selection into the dataset or into the service offshoring activity, (ii) allowing for
dynamics in employment in a difference GMM model, and (iii) applying several modifications to the IV
strategy.
This paper contributes to the literature estimating the labor market effects of offshoring, pioneered by
Feenstra and Hanson (1996a,b, 1999). Focusing predominantly on the offshoring of manufactured inputs,
numerous studies have applied their proxy for offshoring, which is based on industry-level imports and
input-output tables, to the analysis of worker-level wages and employment.5 The same approach has further
been applied to the analysis of individual-level wages.6 Recently, Hummels et al. (2014) have brought the
analysis to firm-worker data for Denmark, which allows them to measure (and instrument for) offshoring
using firm-level import data. An alternative firm-level approach has exploited the activities of multinational
enterprises’ foreign affiliates to measure offshoring.7 Matching methods have been applied to analyze the
employment effects at the extensive margin of offshoring by Monarch et al. (2017), using firm offshoring
events in the US, and by Moser et al. (2015), exploiting qualitative information from an establishment-level
survey in Germany. The majority of these studies find that offshoring of manufactured inputs has small
adverse effects on low-skilled workers’ domestic employment or wages.
Amiti and Wei (2005, 2009a) were the first to apply the approach developed by Feenstra and Hanson
to services. They analyze the relationship between employment and service offshoring at the industry level
in the UK and the US, where they find mixed evidence and rather small correlations. Crinò (2010b, 2012)
further investigates the relative employment effects across skill groups in the US and Europe. He finds that
service offshoring favors high-skilled employment, similar to offshoring of manufactured inputs.8 These
findings are confirmed in worker-level wage data for the UK by Geishecker and Görg (2013), who also
rely on the industry-level service offshoring measure. The two studies most closely related to this paper
are Crinò (2010a) and Hijzen et al. (2011), who examine the link between service offshoring and firm-level
employment. Crinò (2010a) applies matching methods to a cross-section of Italian firms to investigate the
employment effects at the extensive margin of service offshoring, which turn out to be insignificant as in this
paper. While he compares firms that import services to those that do not, the German firm panel data allow
5This literature is reviewed by Feenstra and Hanson (2003). A recent contribution in this vein is by Wright (2014), who finds
evidence for negative effects of offshoring on employment and positive effects on output in US industries.
6See Ebenstein et al. (2014, 2015) for the US and Geishecker and Görg (2008) and Baumgarten et al. (2013) for Germany.
7Examples include Head and Ries (2002) for Japan, Muendler and Becker (2010) for Germany, as well as Harrison and McMil-
lan (2011) and Sethupathy (2013) for the US. Note that this approach restricts attention to intra-firm offshoring and is less suitable
to study the offshoring of services, since my data reveal that the bulk of service offshoring by German firms is to unrelated parties,
not to foreign affiliates or investors.
8Criscuolo and Garicano (2010), Jensen and Kletzer (2005, 2010), and Liu and Trefler (2011) develop alternative approaches
for identifying tradable services from US occupational data to investigate the labor market implications of services offshoring. A
related strand of the literature has studied the effect of service offshoring on productivity; see Amiti and Wei (2009b) and Winkler
(2010) for industry-level studies and Crinò (2008) for a firm-level analysis.
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me to extend this approach to a difference-in-differences setup, which examines changes in employment in
firms that start importing services, thereby controlling for time-invariant confounding factors. Hijzen et al.
(2011) use detailed import data for the UK to show that increasing service offshoring coincides with higher
employment growth. However, their approach does not address the likely endogeneity of offshoring, so
they conclude that the positive correlation may be explained either by efficiency gains from offshoring or
by simultaneity. This paper applies an IV strategy to eliminate the second possibility, and thus provides first
causal evidence for the firm-level employment gains from increased service offshoring.
This paper contributes more generally to the literature analyzing service trade (surveyed by Francois and
Hoekman, 2010), which is small compared to the abundance of research on goods trade. A distinguishing
feature is the intangible and non-storable nature of services, which traditionally could be delivered only face
to face (Hill, 1977). By relaxing this requirement, advancements in ICT have contributed to a steep decline
of international trade costs for many services over the past decades (see Hoekman and Braga, 1997; Freund
and Weinhold, 2002). Despite the differences to goods trade, previous studies found that aggregate service
trade is well explained by the traditional gravity equation (Kimura and Lee, 2006; Head et al., 2009). It was
not until recent years that firm-level service trade data have become available, which have uncovered that
service-trading firms are a small group, with a similar and even more pronounced heterogeneity in terms
of performance than found for goods traders (see most prominently Breinlich and Criscuolo, 2011, for the
UK).9 The key advantage of the dataset used in this paper relative to previous studies is that it combines
(close to) full coverage of German firms’ service trade with information on firm employment and other key
characteristics, which allows for a comprehensive causal analysis.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the rich micro dataset of German firms’ service
trade compiled for this study. Section 3 describes the within-firm correlations between employment and
service offshoring found in simple OLS estimations. Section 4 introduces propensity score matching to
scrutinize the employment effects at the extensive margin of offshoring. Section 5 develops the IV strategy
and uses it to investigate the employment effects at the intensive margin of service offshoring. The final
section concludes with a brief discussion of the findings and their implications.
2 Data
2.1 Data sources
The panel dataset of German firms used in this paper combines information from three sources: the Statis-
tics on International Trade in Services (SITS), the Corporate Balance Sheet Statistics (USTAN), and the
Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi). These confidential micro datasets are provided by the Research
Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank (the German central bank) on site for re-
search purposes. Only recently, these datasets have been linked at the RDSC, and this paper is among the
first to exploit information combined from all three sources.10 This link is essential for the paper’s objective
because SITS does not contain information on firm employment, which is hence taken from USTAN and
MiDi (see Section 2.2 on how the data are combined).
The Statistics on International Trade in Services (SITS, Biewen et al., 2013) provides highly detailed
9Similar patterns have been documented by Ariu (2016) for Belgium, Federico and Tosti (2016) for Italy, Gaulier et al. (2010)
for France, Kelle and Kleinert (2010) for Germany (using the same service trade data as this paper), Morikawa (2015) for Japan,
Wolfmayr et al. (2013) for Austria, and Damijan et al. (2015) for four other European countries.
10MiDi has previously been used in combination with USTAN (e.g. by Jäckle and Wamser, 2010; Muendler and Becker, 2010),
or in combination with SITS (Biewen et al., 2012). Eppinger (2014) provides first explorations of a dataset linking all three sources.
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panel data on imports and exports of services by firm, month, partner country, and service category for
around 22,000-26,000 firms over the years 2001-2013 (a full list of all countries and service categories is
provided in the documentation). Service trade flows are defined as transactions between German residents
and non-residents, which correspond to the modes 1 (cross-border trade), 2 (consumption abroad), and 4
(presence of natural persons) according to the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
Transactions via commercial presence (GATS mode 3), such as purchases by foreign affiliates, are not
included in this definition, which is ideal given the paper’s focus on domestic employment effects. The data
contain the universe of German firms’ service trade for all transactions exceeding the reporting threshold
of e 12,500. The high level of detail and the comprehensive coverage of these data make them uniquely
suited to address the research question posed in this paper. These features represent key advantages over
the vast majority of firm-level service trade data previously used in the literature, which are based on firm
surveys.11 In particular, the SITS data allow me to construct a firm-specific instrument for service offshoring
(see Section 5.1). The analysis in this paper focuses on tradable commercial services, which are typically the
subject of the offshoring debate. Therefore, it excludes all service trade classified as government services,
incidental payments, private transfers, royalties and license fees, as well as travel and transport services.12
Any references to total service imports throughout the paper refer to these tradable commercial services. In
anticipation of the IV strategy, the remaining service categories are grouped into ten service types – such
as communications, engineering, or research and development services – according to Table A.1, which
broadly follows Biewen et al. (2013). The SITS are also aggregated over months to combine them with the
other annual datasets.
Information on firm employment comes from two data sources. The first is the German Corporate Bal-
ance Sheet Statistics (USTAN, see Deutsche Bundesbank, 1998; Stöss, 2001). This dataset contains detailed
balance sheets and income statements of a large number of non-financial German firms. Crucially for this
paper, it includes information on the number of employees. The USTAN data are collected by the Deutsche
Bundesbank for the purpose of credit assessments. The balance sheet data are used and carefully validated
by central bank staff to assess the value of securitized, non-marketable claims or bills of exchange, which
are presented as collateral to the central bank by commercial banks. The analysis excludes all consolidated
balance sheets pertaining to corporations, as well as balance sheets referring to a short fiscal year. The full
USTAN dataset used in this paper covers the years 1999-2013 and includes around 22,000-29,000 firms per
year during the main period of analysis, 2002-2013.
The second source of employment data is the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi, see Lipponer,
2011; Schild and Walter, 2017), which contains information on all German firms with inward or outward
stocks of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) above a reporting threshold. This threshold has been unchanged
since 2002 at a minimum of 10% shares or voting rights in an affiliate with a balance sheet total exceeding
e 3 million. Most importantly in the context of this paper, MiDi contains information on the number of
employees and turnover for all firms involved in FDI, i.e., each multinational enterprise (MNE) and each
foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) in Germany. The bulk of information contained in MiDi serves to provide
a detailed picture of German firms’ FDI links, including information on the country and industry of their
foreign affiliates or investors. These data are exploited in this paper to identify German firms which have a
related party in the country and industry to which they offshore services.
11Of the datasets used in all previous studies known to me, only the Belgian data used by Ariu (2016) are comparable to the SITS
in terms of coverage.
12These payments cannot be thought of as offshoring, as is also argued by Head et al. (2009). Liu and Trefler (2011) make an
analogous selection.
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Bilateral data on international trade in services across country pairs, required to construct the IV (in
Section 5.1), is taken from the UN Comtrade database.13 Since information is frequently missing at more
disaggregate levels, I use service trade data for a set of service codes corresponding largely to the first level
of the Extended Balance of Payments Services (EBOPS) 2002 classification. The EBOPS codes are matched
to the service types in the SITS data according to the correspondence reported in Table A.1.
2.2 Data preparation
The three micro-level datasets are combined via firm identification numbers, which are identical in SITS and
MiDi. They are matched to USTAN via a correspondence table provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank (see
Schild et al., 2017), resulting in the new combined dataset. Since USTAN does not cover the full population
of German firms, and since by far not all firms are involved in service trade or FDI, the three data sources
overlap only imperfectly. Nevertheless, the combined sample for which data on both firm employment and
service imports are available (around 57,000 firms per year) includes on average 80% of the total service
import value reported in SITS in a given year. This impressive coverage is due to the fact that the (almost
fully covered) MNEs and FIEs in MiDi as well as the firms reporting to USTAN tend to be large compared
to the average firm and hence account for a disproportionate share of total service imports. They also make
up on average 25% of aggregate employment and 53% of aggregate turnover in the underlying non-financial
private business sector per year.14 Overall, the newly combined dataset provides an almost comprehensive
picture of German firms’ service offshoring activities and the firms in this dataset employ a substantial share
of the entire German labor force.
Since SITS covers the entire universe of German firms’ service trade (above a low reporting threshold),
firms from USTAN and MiDi that do not show up in SITS have negligible service imports and exports,
which can hence be set to zero. Similarly, one can be sure that a firm in USTAN or SITS is not involved in
any economically significant inward or outward FDI if it does not report to MiDi.
Information on firm employment, the key outcome variable analyzed in this paper, is taken from either
USTAN or MiDi, with preference given to the former data source, as it also contains the balance sheet
information used to construct additional control variables in the empirical analysis. Due to the importance
of firm employment, I implement a number of consistency checks to validate this variable and eliminate
potential outliers, as described in Appendix A.2.
Two important variables, which are not readily observable in the data but required for parts of the
empirical analysis, are physical capital stocks and total factor productivity (TFP). Physical capital stocks are
constructed by the perpetual inventory method, closely following the procedure applied by Bachmann and
Bayer (2014) to the USTAN data, which is outlined in Appendix A.3.
Firm productivity has been established in both theoretical and empirical work as an important determi-
nant of firms’ offshoring activities and their effects for firm employment (see Antràs and Helpman, 2004;
Egger et al., 2015; Kohler and Smolka, 2014). Labor productivity (LP), defined as real value added over em-
ployment,15 will be used as a simple proxy, but a more comprehensive and hence preferable measure of pro-
ductivity is TFP. Since TFP is unobserved, it is estimated as the residual from industry-specific value added
13These data are obtained from https://comtrade.un.org/data/.
14These figures are based on data from the German national accounts from the German Statistical Office (see
https://www.destatis.de/EN/). The non-financial private business sector is defined by excluding the sectors not covered in the
micro data: private households, public administration, and the financial sector.
15Throughout the paper, wages are deflated by the consumer price index (CPI), while turnover, value added, and profits are
deflated by the industry-level producer price index (complemented by the CPI whenever missing). These data are obtained from
the German Statistical Office.
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production functions. The estimation procedure implemented in this paper, described in Appendix A.4, re-
solves the well-known endogeneity issues by applying the estimator suggested by Ackerberg et al. (2015),
building on the approach developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
2.3 Stylized facts about the micro-structure of service offshoring
The subsequent analysis of correlations (in Section 3.2) and employment effects at the extensive margin of
service offshoring (in Section 4) draws on the entire combined firm dataset whenever possible, subject to the
availability of control variables and other required information. For the main analysis of employment effects
at the intensive margin of service offshoring (in Section 5), the sample needs to be restricted to firms with
positive service imports and employment information observed in several years over the period 2002-2013.
The reason is that the identification strategy, which will be described in detail in Section 5.1, relies on time
variation in imports. It further depends on the availability of aggregate service trade data from Comtrade,
which reduces the estimation sample slightly. Since the main focus of the empirical analysis is on changes
at the intensive margin, the full estimation sample used for this analysis (corresponding to the estimates
reported in column 1 of Table 4) is described in more detail in this section.
The full estimation sample contains 7,100 firms (around 3,400 per year), which account on average for
71% of total service imports in SITS per year. Even though the number of firms in this sample is small
compared to the original data sources, they account for the bulk of all service offshoring and around half
of the aggregate employment and turnover in the combined USTAN and MiDi datasets. Hence, continuous
service importers represent around 11% of aggregate employment and 25% of aggregate turnover in the
German non-financial private business sector. These numbers are even higher in the manufacturing sector,
where the full estimation sample accounts for 21% of aggregate employment and 27% of aggregate turnover
(due to a higher coverage rate of USTAN).
Table 1 provides summary statistics of several key variables in the USTAN and SITS samples as well
as the full estimation sample. The combined dataset created for this paper provides the first opportunity
to examine the characteristics of German service importers compared to other firms. As pointed out by
Kelle and Kleinert (2010), German firms from all sectors are engaged in importing and exporting services.
These service importers are a small group, among which import volumes are heavily concentrated in even
fewer firms, as the numbers cited in the previous paragraph suggest. This heterogeneity is also visible in
several dimensions of firm size and performance. By comparing the USTAN sample with the subset of
SITS for which additional firm information is available from the other sources, it can be seen that service
importers are larger in terms of employment, capital stocks, and turnover; they pay higher wages, are more
productive (in terms of LP) and more profitable (in terms of accounting profits) than other firms in USTAN.
Furthermore, the table suggests that firms included in the estimation sample are even larger on average
in terms of employment and turnover, which seems plausible since these firms are successfully offshoring
services over several years. This fact can rationalize why the firms in the estimation sample account for the
bulk of total service imports, as discussed in the previous paragraph.
The data further reveal that the service importing structure is highly firm-specific and stable over time
within firms, two features that are important for the IV approach. Out of the possible 2,450 country-service
type combinations, positive imports are observed for 2,030 combinations in the full estimation sample.
The median firm in this sample imports ten different country-service type combinations. These import
choices vary substantially across firms, such that only a small number of country-service type combinations
7
Table 1: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
USTAN sample SITS sample Full estimation sample
Variable Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N
employment 216 2,204 276,357 619 4,255 99,305 1,017 6,129 40,905
ln employment 3.682 1.737 276,357 4.910 1.669 99,305 5.468 1.554 40,905
service importer 0.125 0.331 320,398 0.874 0.332 323,059 1.000 0.000 40,905
ln service imports 5.810 2.166 40,054 5.323 2.022 282,362 7.218 2.050 40,905
# countries 0.787 4.071 320,398 3.504 6.649 323,059 9.956 12.735 40,905
# service types 0.278 0.943 320,398 1.563 1.358 323,059 2.973 1.927 40,905
# country-service types 8.776 19.538 41,689 4.687 11.847 323,059 15.140 25.859 40,905
ln narrrow offshoring 5.900 2.304 4,501 5.359 2.083 63,678 7.367 2.454 6,668
ln intra-firm offshoring 6.401 2.669 2,252 6.057 2.420 11,878 6.651 2.583 5,765
service exporter 0.037 0.189 320,398 0.317 0.465 323,059 0.440 0.496 40,905
ln service exports 6.924 2.435 11,865 6.223 2.257 102,428 7.865 2.400 17,990
ln turnover 8.947 2.009 307,217 10.722 1.654 97,814 11.289 1.587 40,753
goods exporter 0.287 0.452 320,398 0.075 0.263 323,059 0.285 0.452 40,905
ln capital 7.701 2.241 252,059 9.257 2.215 35,629 9.783 2.140 15,498
ln wage 3.734 0.568 267,276 4.062 0.457 39,868 4.077 0.373 16,868
ln output 4.346 2.013 307,049 6.316 1.645 39,911 6.864 1.559 16,828
ln LP 4.632 0.858 274,467 4.942 0.812 40,059 4.964 0.731 16,927
ln profits 5.582 2.115 241,046 7.579 2.069 28,704 8.031 2.028 11,361
Note: The table lists the mean, standard deviation (SD), and number of observations (N) for important variables used
in the analysis for three different samples: The USTAN sample (51,926 firms, columns 1 to 3), the SITS sample
(84,807 firms, columns 4 to 6), and the full estimation sample used in the analysis of employment effects at the
intensive margin of service offshoring (7,100 firms, columns 7 to 9). Source: RDSC of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
SITS, MiDi, and USTAN, 2001-2013, own calculations.
feature positive imports from many firms.16 For instance, only six firms report positive imports for the
median country-service type combination in 2007, the middle of the sample period. This fact illustrates
that typically very few firms share the same service offshoring strategy. Instead, the importing structure is
highly firm-specific, presumably driven by the specific needs of individual firms. As noted by Hummels
et al. (2014) in the context of goods trade, the importing structure varies substantially across firms even
within narrowly defined industries. This observation casts doubt on the standard approach in the offshoring
literature, which applies the same input coefficients to all firms in an industry based on aggregate input-
output tables. The German data reveal that this concern applies also to service trade, calling for a firm-level
approach to measuring (and instrumenting) service offshoring, as the one pursued in this paper.
To illustrate the stability of firms’ importing structure over time, I compute the share of the total service
import value in the full estimation sample that is accounted for by the firm-country-service type combina-
tions that are observed in the first importing year for each firm.17 The data show that these firm-country-
service type combinations from the first year account for 57% of the total service import value in the full
estimation sample of all subsequent years. For the average firm in the estimation sample, these initial
country-service type combinations even amount to 73% of their total import value. This observation reflects
a high degree of persistence in the firms’ service importing structure over time, which is comparable to the
persistence observed in Danish goods trade (Hummels et al., 2014). These features of the data allow me
to hold the initial import shares by country and service type constant when instrumenting for the intensive
margin of service offshoring in the empirical analysis. Despite the stable importing structure, there is also
16In 2007, the most popular service imports are ‘other business services’ (in particular the category ‘advertising, commercial,
and administrative services’) from Switzerland, followed by imports of the same service type from the UK and the US.
17The data from this first year for each firm constitute the pre-sample and will be omitted in the main empirical analysis for the
reasons described in Section 5.1.
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considerable within-firm variation in the value of service imports over time, reflected in a coefficient of
variation of 0.429 (the standard deviation of service imports based on the within-firm variation relative to
the mean) in the full estimation sample. The empirical analysis in Section 5 investigates to what extent this
variation in service offshoring can explain changes in firm employment.
3 Econometric model and within-firm correlations
3.1 Econometric model
To investigate the relationship between service offshoring activities and employment of firm i, active in
industry j and year t, the following econometric model is specified:
ln employmenti,t =   · service offshoringi,t +' ·Xi,t 1 + ↵j,t + ↵i + "i,t, (1)
where the key explanatory variable service offshoringi,t represents either a dummy variable indicating posi-
tive service imports (for the analysis at the extensive margin of offshoring), or the logarithm of the value of
service imports ln service importsi,t (for the intensive margin), or alternative measures of service offshoring
that will be introduced throughout the analysis. Firm employment is the main dependent variable of interest
in this paper. Yet, other firm performance measures will also be considered as alternative dependent vari-
ables in equation (1). The main parameter of interest is  , the partial effect of service offshoring on firm
employment.
Importantly, equation (1) includes firm fixed effects ↵i, which absorb any time-invariant components
of the firm’s market environment and geographic location, its productivity, size, ownership structure, and
other firm characteristics. In addition, the industry-year fixed effects ↵j,t absorb any shocks to demand,
factor markets, or technology that are common to all firms in an industry. The equation further includes the
following firm-level control variables Xi,t 1 lagged by one year (with associated coefficients '): dummy
variables indicating whether the firm is a service exporter, an MNE, or an FIE (both defined by the MiDi
thresholds, see Section 2.1), as well as ln turnover.
Equation (1) is the firm-level analogue to the employment equations estimated by Amiti and Wei (2005,
2009a).18 It can be derived as a conditional labor demand function from a standard cost minimization
problem of the firm (see e.g. Hamermesh, 1993). For this purpose, it is assumed that wages are exogenous to
firms and absorbed by industry-year fixed effects. This assumption is innocuous to the extent that wages are
set at the industry level by unions, which play an important role in the German labor market. Nevertheless,
it is relaxed in a robustness check in Section 5.7.
OLS regressions would yield consistent estimates of   only under the strong assumption that the error
term "i,t in equation (1) is uncorrelated with service offshoring (and the other explanatory variables), e.g.
because it is due to random measurement error. While Section 3.2 does examine OLS estimates of  , I
abstain from making this assumption, as it seems unlikely to hold in practice. In particular, the alternative
measures of service offshoringi,t may be correlated with the error term due to the simultaneity of employ-
ment and offshoring decisions, both of which are affected by output demand, technology, and labor supply
shocks. Therefore, the OLS estimates presented below are interpreted as conditional correlations and causal
analysis is relegated to Sections 4 and 5.
18In contrast to their approach of first-differencing, I prefer to estimate the equation using the within transformation to consider
also medium-term employment effects, maintain a larger sample, and facilitate the analysis of interaction effects below. A first-
differenced version of equation (1) is considered in Section 5.6.
9
3.2 Within-firm correlations
Table 2 demonstrates that various measures of service offshoring activity are positively correlated with
employment and other dimensions of performance in German firms. It reports the estimated conditional
correlations between various firm variables, indicated in the header (all in logs), and several alternative
measures for service offshoring, indicated in each row. Each cell reports an estimate of   based on a
different variant of the within-transformed equation (1).19 The estimate shown in the top cell in column 1
examines the correlation of employment with the firm extensive margin of service offshoring, as measured
by the service importer dummy. The FE estimate suggests that firms do not experience a significant increase
or decrease in terms of employment as they start (or stop) service offshoring. There is also no significant
correlation of the wage per employee with the importer dummy (see column 2). However, the remaining
estimates reported in the first row (columns 3-6) show that service offshoring firms are larger in terms
of output, more productive as measured by TFP, and more profitable (in terms of real accounting profits)
than non-offshoring firms. These findings extend the results of Breinlich and Criscuolo (2011), who have
estimated performance ‘premia’ of service importers in similar regressions using cross-sectional variation
across UK firms. Table 2 reveals that these performance differences in terms of output and productivity are
significant (though much smaller) even when identified from time variation within firms in Germany.
Table 2: Within-firm correlations of firm performance and service offshoring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Employment Wage Output LP TFP Profits # firms range
service importer 0.00267 -0.00162 0.0374*** 0.00961** 0.00820** 0.0315** 30,437-41,755
(0.00497) (0.00287) (0.00464) (0.00479) (0.00413) (0.0154)
# service types 0.0168*** 0.000509 0.0195*** 0.00346 0.00351* 0.0159** 30,437-41,755
(0.00202) (0.00131) (0.00224) (0.00226) (0.00206) (0.00734)
# countries 0.00881*** -0.000277 0.00829*** 0.00148 0.00246*** 0.00966*** 30,437-41,755
(0.000858) (0.000469) (0.000917) (0.000898) (0.000768) (0.00257)
# country-service types 0.00407*** 0.0000579 0.00365*** 0.000671 0.00116*** 0.00334** 4,362-12,233
(0.000486) (0.000210) (0.000543) (0.000433) (0.000350) (0.00145)
ln service imports 0.0252*** 0.00126 0.0343*** 0.0124*** 0.0119*** 0.0329*** 4,193-11,872
(0.00242) (0.00160) (0.00268) (0.00275) (0.00228) (0.00862)
ln narrow offshoring 0.0280*** -0.00468 0.0421*** 0.0119 0.00687 0.0347 434-2,049
(0.00625) (0.00672) (0.01000) (0.0119) (0.00924) (0.0275)
Note: The table reports FE estimates of equation (1). Each cell corresponds to one single regression, where the dependent
variable is the log of the variable indicated in the header and the explanatory variable measuring service offshoring is indicated in
each row. The last column reports the range of the number of firms per row. All regressions control for lagged dummy variables
indicating service exporter, MNE, and FIE status, lagged ln turnover, as well as fixed effects by firm and by industry-year.
Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms. Asterisks indicate
significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: RDSC of the Deutsche Bundesbank, SITS, MiDi, and USTAN,
2001-2013, own calculations.
The second, third, and fourth row of Table 2 extend the analysis by considering several within-firm
extensive margins of service offshoring as explanatory variables in equation (1). They examine one by
one the correlations of firm performance with the number of source countries, service types, and country-
service type combinations in which positive service imports are observed. The estimates reveal that firms
which start offshoring to another country, or those adding another service type or another country-service
type combination to their offshoring activities, become larger in terms of output and employment, more
productive in terms of TFP, and more profitable. Plausibly, the correlations are higher at the levels of service
19The remaining coefficient estimates are not reported to conserve space. The last column lists the range of the number of
firms per row, which varies slightly depending on data availability. These estimations, as well as most others in this paper, are
implemented using the Stata command reghdfe (Correia, 2014).
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types or countries compared to the more disaggregate country-service type combinations. The estimates
suggest that, for example, a firm experiences larger performance changes if it starts offshoring IT services
for the first time (to any country), compared to the situation in which it is already importing IT services
from one country (e.g. India) and starts to import them additionally from another country (e.g. China). The
correlations with wages and LP are very small and insignificant throughout.
The intensive margin of service offshoring is examined in in the fifth row of Table 2, which uses
ln service imports as an explanatory variable. Note that the requirement of positive imports in at least
two years reduces the sample substantially compared to the full sample of USTAN and MiDi firms that was
used to examine the firm extensive margin. The estimate reported in column 1 suggests that an increase in
service imports by 10% coincides on average with a small increase in employment by 0.252%. The esti-
mated coefficient is insignificant in the wage regression, while output, productivity, and profits are positively
correlated with the intensive margin of offshoring. The sixth row applies an alternative, narrow definition
of offshoring by focusing on imports in the service type that corresponds to the firm’s own 2-digit NACE
Rev. 1.1 industry code (similar to the narrow measure by Feenstra and Hanson, 1999). Since only firms
in the service sector can have positive values of narrow offshoring, the sample is drastically reduced. The
estimated correlations with narrow offshoring are positive for employment and output, but insignificant for
all other performance variables.
Due to the endogeneity issues discussed in Section 3.1, the OLS estimates in Table 2 cannot be inter-
preted as causal effects of offshoring. In particular, the positive estimates for employment and output may
reflect a positive efficiency gain from offshoring, but they could also be driven by demand shocks or pro-
ductivity shocks inducing simultaneity bias. These issues are addressed in detail in the next sections. First,
Section 4 scrutinizes the effect of starting service offshoring (the firm-level extensive margin) on employ-
ment through matching methods. Second, Section 5 investigates the employment effect of increasing service
offshoring (the intensive margin) through an IV.
4 Employment effects at the extensive margin of service offshoring
4.1 Combining difference-in-differences and propensity score matching
In order to estimate the employment effect at the extensive margin of service offshoring, this section adopts
a difference in differences (DiD) propensity score matching (PSM) approach. This approach compares the
employment changes in offshoring firms to those in a suitably defined control group of non-offshoring firms.
Formally, I am interested in the average effect of starting service offshoring on the employment of offshoring
firms, i.e., the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT):
ATT⌧,t = ( ⌧,tL1,i   ⌧,tL0,i|Oi,t = 1), ⌧ = {1, 2, 5}. (2)
In this equation,  ⌧,tLo,i ⌘
 
ln employmento,i,t 1+⌧   ln employmento,i,t 1
 
denotes the relative change
in employment of firm i with offshoring status o = {0, 1} between the pre-treatment year t   1 and year
t   1 + ⌧ . The treatment variable Oi,t is an indicator for offshoring firms that start to import services in
year t for the first time (within the sample period 2001-2013). The ATT in equation (2) is estimated for
three different time horizons. In the first specification, I set ⌧ = 1 to examine the immediate employment
effect in the first offshoring year. Since domestic employment may need time to adjust, I examine also the
medium-term effects after two and five years (⌧ = 2, 5). The latter two exercises adopt the convention that
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a firm is classified as offshoring only if it continues to import services in two (five) consecutive years.
The obvious challenge in estimating the ATT in equation (2) is that the employment changes of an
offshoring firm i are observed only for the situation in which it is offshoring ( ⌧,tL1,i), but not for the
counterfactual situation in which it is not offshoring ( ⌧,tL0,i). One way to address this challenge is
by using the employment changes of a suitable control group to impute the counterfactual employment
changes of the offshoring firms. As a potential control group, I consider all firms which have not previously
imported any services within the sample period and do not start offshoring in the same year. However, some
of these non-offshoring firms differ in important ways from the treated firms and may hence not be suitable
to estimate  ⌧,tL0,i. To illustrate these differences, Figure 1 shows the evolution of average employment
over time in unmatched samples of offshoring and non-offshoring firms for four exemplary configurations
of treatment and control groups. The graphs on the left examine firms that start service offshoring in 2006
(compared to those that do not), while the graphs on the right consider the starting year 2010. The top graphs
only restrict the sample to those firms that did not import services before, and the bottom graphs additionally
require that offshorers consecutively import services for at least two years. It is apparent from all four
configurations that service offshoring firms are larger in terms of employment throughout the observation
period, including the years before they start offshoring.20 This pattern may be explained by the fact that
larger firms self-select into offshoring, for instance, because they are more productive and hence better able
to cover the associated fixed costs (see e.g. Antràs and Helpman, 2004).
Figure 1 further suggests that employment in offshoring and non-offshoring firms follows a similar trend
in the pre-offshoring period for the examples depicted. The assumption of a common pre-treatment trend
is necessary for consistently estimating the ATT in a standard DiD setup, so this observation is reassuring.
Also, there seems to be a small positive deviation from the trend for offshoring firms in the year in which
they start importing services, in particular for those starting to offshore in 2010. However, these observations
are merely indicative and may be confounded relative to the true ATTs by a variety of factors, e.g. if the size
differences across offshoring and non-offshoring firms discussed above have dynamic implications.
To provide a more complete and rigorous assessment of the ATT, I implement propensity score match-
ing (PSM). The idea behind PSM is to determine a control group of firms that are as comparable as pos-
sible to the treated firms based on a set of observed covariates Mi,t 1. In their seminal work, Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1983) show that this objective can be achieved by matching observations based on the
treatment probability predicted by Mi,t 1, the propensity score pi,t ⌘ Pr(Oi,t = 1|Mi,t 1). This ap-
proach allows for consistently estimating the ATT under three assumptions. First, the ‘conditional mean
independence’ assumption requires that the average outcome (in the present application, the change in
employment) is independent of the treatment conditional on the covariates, which is formally stated as
E [ ⌧,tL0,i|Mi,t 1, Oi,t] = E [ ⌧,tL0,i|Mi,t 1].21 Loosely speaking, this assumption is fulfilled if on
average the observed pre-treatment characteristics Mi,t 1 account also for unobserved factors that influ-
ence selection into treatment. While standard in the matching context, the conditional mean independence
assumption is crucial for identification and fundamentally untestable. However, covariate balancing tests
discussed below provide reassuring evidence that the PSM approach successfully accounts for differences
between treated and untreated firms. Second, the ‘stable unit treatment value’ assumption requires that the
treatment affects all treated firms similarly and does not affect the non-treated firms. Arguably, this assump-
20Similar differences in terms of various firm characteristics are apparent from a comparison of the full USTAN sample with the
preferred estimation sample, which includes only the subset of firms with positive imports (see Table 1).
21This assumption, sometimes referred to as unconfoundedness or ignorability in means (Wooldridge, 2010), is weaker than
strict ignorability of the treatment, as the treatment is required to be ignorable only on average.
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Figure 1: Employment over time for offshoring and non-offshoring firms
(a) Start offshoring in 2006 (b) Start offshoring in 2010
(c) Start offshoring in 2006 for at least 2 years (d) Start offshoring in 2010 for at least 2 years
Note: The graphs plot the log of average employment for different groups of firms over time. The top left (right) graph defines
offshoring firms as those starting to import services for the first time in 2006 (2010). The bottom left (right) graph defines
offshoring firms as those starting to import services for the first time in 2006 (2010) and consecutively import services for at least
two years. Source: RDSC of the Deutsche Bundesbank, SITS, MiDi, and USTAN, 2001-2013, own calculations.
tion may be questioned in any setting in which treated firms are competing with untreated firms in imperfect
product or factor markets and may hence affect their performance through spillovers. However, since ser-
vice imports make up a small share of firms’ purchases on average, and given that firms are not matched
within narrowly defined industries or regions, any violations of this assumption should have negligible ef-
fects in the present application. Third, the ‘common support’ assumption requires overlap between treated
and untreated firms, i.e., Pr(Oi,t = 1|Mi,t 1) < 1 8Mi,t 1 2 Mt 1, where Mt 1 is the support of the
covariates. Intuitively, for each treated firm and each covariate, there must exist at least one untreated firm
with the same value for the covariate. This condition is enforced below by excluding the few treated firms
off the common support.
The propensity score pi,t is estimated separately for each offshoring year t using logit regressions of
the treatment dummy Oi,t on the matching covariates Mi,t 1.22 The variables included in Mi,t 1 are
chosen to make firms comparable in terms of their initial service trade and foreign investment linkages, size,
and key employment characteristics. The preferred set of covariates Mi,t 1 includes the following firm
22Since the sets of treated and control firms vary by the selected time horizon ⌧ = {1, 2, 5}, three different logit regressions are
implemented for each year t (and strictly speaking, the propensity score should have an index ⌧ , omitted for brevity).
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characteristics measured in the pre-treatment year t   1: dummy variables indicating whether the firm is a
service exporter, an MNE, or a FIE, as well as log values of the firm’s turnover, employment, and average
wage per employee. This choice is the result of solving a trade-off between data availability and match
quality, and it resembles the sets of covariates used in the previous matching literature on offshoring (Crinò,
2010a; Monarch et al., 2017; Moser et al., 2015). Also, the main conclusions obtained below are insensitive
to small variations in this set. The logit regressions reveal that the preferred covariates are individually
significant predictors of treatment in most years and jointly yield a pseudo R2 of around 18% on average.
Several alternative matching algorithms may be used in combination with the estimated propensity score
to construct an appropriate counterfactual. In my preferred specification, I employ the kernel-based match-









35 if |pi,t   pk| < 0.01, (3)
where Nt denotes the number of offshoring (treated) firms in year t, and w(pi,t, pj,t) is the weight of each
matched firm j from the control group Ji,t:
w(pi,t, pj,t) =
K [(pi,t   pj,t)/b]P
j2Ji,t K [(pi,t   pj,t)/b]
.
The preferred specification uses an Epanechnikov kernel function K[·] and a bandwidth b = 0.01, so Ji,t is
defined as the set of all non-offshoring firms j for which |pi,t   pj,t| < 0.01. This matching algorithm is
chosen because it proves to be superior to several alternative procedures in terms of the subsequent covariate
balancing tests (discussed below). The DiD PSM estimator in equation (3) effectively compares employment
changes in offshoring firms to the weighted average of employment changes of multiple firms in the control
group, where the narrow bandwidth ensures that only very similar firms are included in the control group,
and the kernel function ensures that the most similar firms receive the highest weights. The matching
procedure is implemented using the Stata command psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) and standard
errors are bootstrapped based on 200 replications.23
Note that there is a crucial difference between the DiD PSM estimator employed in this paper and
cross-sectional matching estimators, previously used for instance by Crinò (2010a) in the context of service
offshoring. Crinò (2010a) uses PSM to compare employment levels across firms that import services and
those that do not in a single cross-section. By contrast, this paper defines offshorers as firms that start import-
ing services and exploits time variation within firms to identify the employment effects. Thereby, the DiD
PSM estimator accounts for time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics and is hence superior to simple
cross-sectional matching approaches (see Heckman et al., 1997; Smith and Todd, 2005). Furthermore, the
panel data at hand allow for distinguishing the immediate impact of service offshoring from medium-term
changes to shed some light on the persistence of the employment effects.
4.2 Employment effects of starting service offshoring
The results of implementing the DiD PSM procedure year by year are summarized in Table 3. Panel A
reports the immediate ATT of service offshoring on firm employment in the first offshoring year. Panels B
23While Abadie and Imbens (2008) argue that the bootstrap is not generally valid in the case of nearest neighbor matching, they
expect that it is valid in the case of the kernel-based matching algorithm employed in this paper, for which the number of matches
increases in the sample size.
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and C consider the medium-term effects in firms that start and consecutively offshore services over two
and five years, respectively. The estimated ATTs fluctuate around zero and are never significantly negative.
Instead, firms starting to offshore in the years 2005, 2006, and 2010 even increase their employment signif-
icantly compared to the matched control group in their first offshoring year. These positive ATTs are also
confirmed over the medium term for firms that consecutively offshore for at least two years. For the small
set of firms that starts and consecutively offshores for five years, the estimated ATTs tend to be positive over
this time horizon. However, the effects are only significant for firms that start offshoring in 2003 or 2006.
Overall, the estimated ATTs in Table 3 are rather unstable and insignificant in the majority of years. Hence,
these findings are best summarized as evidence for non-negative employment effects at the extensive margin
of service offshoring.
Table 3: Employment effects of starting service offshoring in DiD PSM estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
A. Immediate employment effects in the first year
ATT1,t -0.00134 0.0168 -0.00927 0.0554** 0.0560** 0.0191 0.000728 0.0142 0.0537** -0.0111 0.00346 0.0142
(0.0191) (0.0204) (0.0183) (0.0250) (0.0257) (0.0154) (0.0196) (0.0176) (0.0230) (0.0133) (0.0155) (0.0142)
Firms 16,302 14,633 13,872 13,407 13,388 13,455 13,622 13,765 14,220 14,392 14,050 13,114
Treated 1,120 886 866 792 840 842 800 812 930 880 806 750
MABR 0.93 0.85 0.95 0.87 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.86 0.94 0.90 0.96 0.87
Pseudo R2 0.00145 0.00354 0.0031 0.00524 0.00259 0.00327 0.0015 0.00522 0.0016 0.00582 0.0012 0.00266
B. Employment effects over two years (consecutive service offshoring)
ATT2,t 0.00909 0.0419 -0.00118 0.0848** 0.104*** 0.0353 0.0295 0.0315 0.109*** -0.0350 0.0207
(0.0295) (0.0338) (0.0508) (0.0375) (0.0385) (0.0399) (0.0373) (0.0358) (0.0374) (0.0262) (0.0224)
Firms 12,935 12,198 11,855 11,893 11,936 12,131 12,226 12,665 12,911 12,975 12,294
Treated 566 480 424 422 454 456 380 418 482 494 418
MABR 0.90 0.92 0.95 0.87 0.92 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.86 0.97
Pseudo R2 0.00299 0.00217 0.00147 0.00812 0.00421 0.00129 0.0015 0.00173 0.00163 0.00559 0.00183
C. Employment effects over five years (consecutive service offshoring)
ATT5,t 0.0213 0.285*** 0.0812 0.139 0.230*** 0.0970 -0.232
(0.0871) (0.0900) (0.159) (0.112) (0.0782) (0.112) (0.258)
Firms 7,748 7,705 7,838 8,269 8,602 8,822 8,618
Treated 178 104 58 47 66 54 36
MABR 0.92 0.78 0.74 0.55 0.69 0.62 0.17
Pseudo R2 0.00355 0.0359 0.0281 0.101 0.0305 0.0436 0.0318
Note: The table reports the estimatedATT⌧,t for firms that start offshoring services in year t (indicated in the header) on changes in employment
over a time period of ⌧ = {1, 2, 5} years, based on the preferred DiD PSM estimator (Epanechnikov kernel matching with a bandwidth of
b = 0.01). The bottom of each panel reports the median absolute bias reduction (MABR) in terms of the pre-treatment matching covariates as
well as the pseudo R2 from regressing these covariates on the estimated propensity score. Standard errors reported in parentheses are bootstrapped
based on 200 replications. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: RDSC of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
SITS, MiDi, and USTAN, 2001-2013, own calculations.
The covariate balancing tests reported at the bottom of each panel suggest that the PSM procedure is
very effective at making the treated and control groups comparable. For the immediate and two-year effects
in panels A and B, the medium absolute bias reduction (MABR) in terms of the pre-treatment matching
variables is 85-97%. Also, logit regressions of the estimated propensity score on the matching variables
yield pseudo R2 values in the range of 0.001-0.008. For the rather small set of firms in the bottom panel,
the same tests indicate a lower, though satisfactory match quality with a MABR of 64% and a pseudo R2 of
0.039 on average. Overall, the PSM seems to successfully account for observable pre-treatment differences
in the matching covariates. To the extent that these covariates also account for unobserved heterogeneity,
the DiD PSM estimator can serve to identify the ATTs.
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Since a variety of alternative matching algorithms and potential covariates are available, I explore the
sensitivity of my results to these choices in robustness checks (which are not reported to save space). The
estimated ATTs are almost identical for radius matching (with a caliper of 0.01), and they have very similar
magnitudes for single nearest-neighbor matching (without caliper). I have also experimented with varying
the set of matching covariates by excluding lagged employment or wages, or by adding the lagged change in
employment. Such variations slightly reduce the match quality (in terms of the MABR), but leave the main
conclusions largely unchanged. All of these robustness checks confirm the main insight from Table 3: The
employment effects at the extensive margin of service offshoring are non-negative within German firms and
may even be positive in some years.
5 Employment effects at the intensive margin of service offshoring
5.1 Identification through instrumental variable
Estimates of equation (1) by OLS to investigate the intensive margin of service offshoring (as shown in
Table 2) may be subject to bias from (at least) three sources. First, any firm-specific productivity or output
demand shock that is not captured by the industry-year fixed effects can be expected to bias the estimate
of   upward due to simultaneity. The reason is that firms which get more productive or face increasing
demand should both grow larger in terms of output and employment and find it easier to overcome the costs
associated with offshoring (see, e.g. Egger et al., 2016; Sethupathy, 2013). Second, it can be expected that
firm-specific (or regional) labor supply shocks bias the estimate of   downward. To see this, consider a
positive shock to labor supply, e.g. due to the moderate negotiation strategy of a firm-level union that de-
mands rather low wages. This increases firm-level employment and simultaneously discourages offshoring,
which is ultimately motivated by international wage differences. The result is a downward bias in  . Third,
the value of imports is an imperfect proxy for the amount of service offshoring, and this measurement error
leads to attenuation bias towards zero as long as it is not systematic. While the net direction and magnitude
of these combined biases is a priori not clear, they all seem to be of first-order relevance.
In order to address the aforementioned endogeneity issues, I exploit world export supply (WES) by
the firms’ trading partners as an IV for the intensive margin of service offshoring. More precisely, the IV
is the firm-specific mix of countries’ export supply to the rest of the world by service type. Intuitively, a
German firm importing a given service from a given partner country benefits disproportionately from an
improvement in this country’s comparative advantage, reflected in its growing exports of this service. Thus,
the firm can respond to the positive supply shock by increasing its amount of service offshoring. Arguably,
the service exports of foreign countries to the rest of the world have no other direct or indirect effect on
firm-level employment, nor are they affected by the German firm itself or by other determinants of the
firm’s employment decision (conditional on the control variables, which include industry-year fixed effects).
Based on this exclusion restriction, WES can be used to instrument for service imports in equation (1). This
idea was first proposed by Hummels et al. (2014) for Danish firms’ goods trade, and I closely follow their
approach in constructing the IV for German firms’ service trade.24 The availability of international data on
bilateral service trade imposes a constraint on the level of disaggregation at which the IV can be constructed
(see Section 2.1). As a result, the IV exploits variation in service exports from 233 partner countries (or
24The scope, structure, and level of detail in the German service trade data is comparable to that of the Danish goods trade data
used by Hummels et al. (2014). Autor et al. (2013) use a similar approach at a more aggregate level, which concentrates on the
impact of Chinese imports on local labor markets in the US and has been applied to German goods trade by Dauth et al. (2014).
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territories) across ten service types over twelve years.







where world export supply WESc,s,t is the export supply by country c of service type s in year t to all
countries in the world except Germany. The weights are firm-level import shares si,c,s,0, defined as the
firm’s share of imports by country and service type in its total service imports in year t = 0, which indicates
the first year in which positive service imports by the firm are observed. The first year is 2001 for the
majority of all firms in the estimation sample, but it is a later year for firms that started to import during the
sample period. All of the observations from t = 0 form the pre-sample, which is subsequently omitted in
all estimations. As demonstrated in Section 2.3, German firms’ service importing structure is very specific
and stable over time. The fact that very few firms share the same service import mix ensures that there is
substantial firm-level variation in the IV, even thoughWESc,s,t by itself is not firm-specific. The stability of
the importing structure further allows me to hold the import shares fixed at their pre-sample values, thereby
avoiding a potential endogeneity issue due to adjustments in these shares over time. Following Hummels et
al. (2014), the first-stage estimation uses a log-log specification, regressing ln service importsi,t on ln IVi,t.
5.2 Employment effects of increasing service offshoring
Table 4 presents one of the main findings of this paper: Increased service offshoring has significantly boosted
firm-level employment in Germany over the period 2002-2013. Panel A of the table reports estimates from
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions of equation (1), instrumenting for service offshoring by world
export supply as described in Section 5.1. The first column considers the full available estimation sample of
firms importing services in multiple years. In this sample, the instrumented service offshoring is estimated
to increase firm-level employment by an elasticity of 7.6%, which is statistically significant at the 1% level.
This positive estimate provides evidence for efficiency gains from service offshoring that lead to firm-level
employment gains. These gains are also economically significant. The estimate suggests that an increase in
service offshoring by 10% (or approximately e 2 million at the mean) would create around eight new jobs
at an average firm in this sample, which has 1,000 employees.
The positive employment effect of service offshoring is confirmed in each of two subsamples defined by
the source of the employment data – MiDi (column 2, comprising MNEs and FIEs) and USTAN (column 3).
The effect is larger in the sample of MNEs and FIEs compared to the USTAN sample, but it maintains its
statistical significance and a similar magnitude in both subsamples. Restricting the sample to USTAN further
allows me to include the following firm-level control variables that may affect employment (in column 4):
a dummy variable indicating goods exporter status, the log of the physical capital stock, and the log of the
real wage per employee, all lagged by one year. The estimated effect of service offshoring changes only
slightly through the inclusion of these additional control variables and implies an elasticity of 5.2%. The
subsequent analysis concentrates on the preferred specifications from columns 1 and 4 of Table 4, with the
former maximizing the sample size and the latter maximizing the set of relevant control variables.
In all of the 2SLS regressions, ln IV proves to be a strong instrument for ln service imports, as evidenced
by the first-stage regression diagnostics in panel B of Table 4. The instrument is a significant predictor of
service offshoring in all samples, characterized by very high F-statistics and a partial R2 of 12-14%, based
on the variation within firms and within industry-years. Given the persistence of the firm-specific sourcing
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pattern, it is not surprising that the firm-specific export supply shocks reflected in the IV explain a substantial
part of the time variation in service offshoring.25 Hence, under the assumption that partner countries’ world
export supply is exogenous to employment in German firms, the 2SLS estimates can be interpreted as causal
effects of increasing service offshoring.
Table 4: Employment effects of increasing service offshoring in 2SLS estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Second-stage estimates. Dependent variable: ln employment
Full sample MiDi USTAN
ln service imports 0.0734*** 0.0730*** 0.0559*** 0.0505***
(0.00861) (0.00986) (0.00928) (0.00834)
lag service exporter -0.00592 -0.00652 -0.00230 -0.00456
(0.00938) (0.0107) (0.0124) (0.0111)
lag MNE 0.0279** 0.0336** 0.0187 0.0256**
(0.0124) (0.0159) (0.0130) (0.0123)
lag FIE -0.0468** -0.0415* -0.0209 -0.0156
(0.0184) (0.0213) (0.0193) (0.0171)
lag ln turnover 0.269*** 0.276*** 0.205*** 0.264***
(0.0147) (0.0159) (0.0183) (0.0250)
lag goods exporter -0.00161
(0.00788)
lag ln capital 0.153***
(0.0154)
lag ln wage -0.338***
(0.0469)
Observations 40,905 32,954 16,574 14,785
Firms 7,100 5,697 2,919 2,688
B. First-stage estimates. Dependent variable: ln service imports
ln IV 0.261*** 0.262*** 0.261*** 0.253***
(0.00705) (0.00797) (0.0103) (0.0109)
F-statistic (excl. IV) 1,374.5 1,081.2 636.2 538.5
p-value of F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Partial R2 (excl. IV) 0.122 0.119 0.137 0.132
Note: The table reports 2SLS estimates of equation (1). The top panel reports second-stage
estimates with ln employment as the dependent variable. All regressions control for fixed
effects by firm and by industry-year. The bottom panel reports results from the first-stage
regressions with ln service imports as the dependent variable. Standard errors reported
in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms. Asterisks
indicate significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: RDSC of the
Deutsche Bundesbank, SITS, MiDi, and USTAN, 2001-2013, own calculations.
It is instructive to compare the 2SLS estimate of   in the first column of Table 4 to the corresponding
OLS estimate in the first column (row 5) of Table 2. The 2SLS estimate is substantially greater, suggesting
a downward bias in the OLS estimate. This finding may seem surprising to readers who expect a posi-
tive simultaneity bias arising from productivity or demand shocks, which would increase both offshoring
25The strong first-stage results reported in Table 4 mirror the significant power of the instruments found by Hummels et al. (2014)
even when they consider multiple interaction terms at the firm-worker level. The high F-statistics in my application accommodate
any potential concerns related to weak instruments.
18
capabilities and firm employment. Three considerations may reconcile the estimation results with these
expectations. First, it seems plausible that firm fixed effects account well for inherent productivity differ-
ences and industry-year fixed effects capture output demand shocks to a large extent, so these sources of
bias do not dominate in the OLS regression. Second, the apparent downward bias may be explained by
labor supply shocks, which simultaneously boost employment and discourage offshoring, as discussed in
Section 5.1. For instance, a firm-level union practicing wage moderation would maintain employment at
a relatively high level and simultaneously reduce the incentive for offshoring. A regional migration inflow
decreasing the wage in the local labor market would have similar effects. The negative correlation between
service offshoring and employment implied by such labor supply shocks biases the OLS estimate of  
downward if they are not adequately controlled for. Third, given that the true employment effect is positive,
any non-systematic measurement error in service offshoring implies attenuation bias that contributes to the
downward bias. The IV approach can eliminate this downward bias, resulting in a larger 2SLS estimate for
  compared to the OLS regression.
The positive employment effects estimated in Table 4 extend and strengthen previous findings by Amiti
and Wei (2005) and Hijzen et al. (2011) for the UK. In particular, Amiti and Wei (2005) uncover mostly pos-
itive correlations between service offshoring and employment at the industry level, and Hijzen et al. (2011)
show that this positive correlation is remarkably robust at the firm level. The new results presented in Ta-
ble 4 show that the employment effect of service offshoring is positive and significant in German firms when
IV techniques are applied to resolve the obvious endogeneity issues. My findings indicate that the positive
correlations of service offshoring and firm employment that can also be found in Germany (see Table 2) are
not driven by confounding factors, but instead, they even seem to be smaller than the positive causal effects.
The 2SLS estimates suggest the conclusion that efficiency gains from service offshoring can indeed boost
firm-level employment. These findings constitute novel firm-level evidence for the mechanism described as
a productivity effect by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), which can rationalize employment gains due
to cost savings from offshoring. The subsequent sections investigate this productivity effect as a source of
the employment gains in more depth.
5.3 Effects on wages, output, and productivity
To better understand the changes that service offshoring triggers within the firm, this section investigates its
impact on other firm outcomes. It considers the wage per employee, output, LP and TFP (all in real terms
and in logs) as alternative dependent variables in equation (1), estimated with and without the additional
firm-level control variables from column 4 of Table 4. Table 5 summarizes the results of 2SLS estimations,
in which ln service imports is instrumented by ln IV throughout.
How does service offshoring affect wages? In fact, a substantial part of the offshoring literature has
concentrated on wage effects. On the one hand, one would expect the direct relocation effect to depress
wages because it frees up domestic labor (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). On the other hand, the
average wage within the firm may be positively affected by the productivity effect, rent-sharing mechanisms
(Sethupathy, 2013), and compositional effects in the labor force.26 The 2SLS wage regressions in the first
two columns of Table 5 find none of these effects dominating, as the estimated coefficient is close to zero
in both specifications. The data do not allow for rejecting the hypothesis of a zero effect of increased ser-
vice offshoring on wages in German firms. This ambiguous result is not surprising in light of the different
countervailing forces just discussed. In combination with the employment gains from Table 4, these find-
26Service offshoring has been found to increase the relative demand for high-skilled labor (Crinò, 2010b,a, 2012).
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ings suggest that service offshoring indeed benefits the overall domestic workforce within the firm, which
experiences increased employment without wage cuts on average.
The analysis proceeds by investigating the output effect of service offshoring. A positive output effect
is an important precondition for positive employment effects. The firm can be expected to hire more do-
mestic labor only if the efficiency gains from service offshoring induce it to increase its optimal scale of
production. Hence, if the productivity effect is responsible for the positive employment effect identified
above, there should also be direct evidence for a positive impact of service offshoring on firm-level output.
The estimates reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 confirm this expectation. Service offshoring signif-
icantly increases firm-level output, and the estimated output gains are substantial, implying an elasticity of
7.1-8.8%. To account for the fact that employment and output may be jointly driven by service offshoring, I
have also experimented with estimating the equations for employment and output jointly in three-stage least
squares regressions, similar to the approach developed by Wright (2014) in the context of US industry-level
offshoring. These (unreported) estimation results confirm the positive effects on both output end employ-
ment.
Table 5: Effects on wages, output, and productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wage Output LP TFP
ln service imports 0.00174 0.00656 0.0847*** 0.0685*** 0.0134 0.0104 0.0210** 0.0181**
(0.00532) (0.00452) (0.0122) (0.0106) (0.00993) (0.00905) (0.00881) (0.00856)
Additional controls no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 16,659 14,222 16,910 14,239 16,718 14,233 15,059 13,831
Note: The table reports 2SLS estimates of equation (1), where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the variable indicated
in the header. All regressions control for the basic set of lagged firm control variables and fixed effects by firm and by industry-
year. The even columns further account for the additional firm-level control variables from column 4 of Table 4. Standard
errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms. Asterisks indicate significance
levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: RDSC of the Deutsche Bundesbank, SITS, MiDi, and USTAN, 2001-2013,
own calculations.
The last four columns of Table 5 examine the effects of offshoring on productivity by using lnLP
and lnTFP as alternative dependent variables in equation (1). For LP as a crude proxy for productivity,
the estimated effect of service offshoring is insignificant, though the point estimates are positive in both
specifications. Apparently, service offshoring increases both value added and employment, so the ratio
between these two variables does not increase significantly. However, when considering estimated TFP as
a more comprehensive measure of productivity, the 2SLS regressions uncover a significantly positive effect
of service offshoring in both specifications (columns 7 and 8). These novel, firm-level results extend the
existing evidence on a positive association between service offshoring and productivity that has been found
in industry-level data by Amiti and Wei (2009b) for the US and by Crinò (2008) for Western Europe. In
sum, Table 5 provides direct evidence for the fact that increased service offshoring raises firm output and
productivity, which can rationalize the employment gains identified in the main analysis.
5.4 Heterogeneous employment effects
Table 6 shows interesting patterns of firm heterogeneity, which support the view that the cost savings from
offshoring are responsible for the firm-level employment growth. The employment effects are expected to
increase in the initial scale of offshoring because the productivity effect works through the infra-marginal
units already offshored. To see this, note that there will be no positive output effect on employment (but
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only a negative relocation effect) in a firm that starts to offshore the first job. By contrast, a firm that
has already offshored some service activities experiences the beneficial productivity effect from further
reductions in offshoring costs in all infra-marginal units that have already been offshored. Hence, a positive
shock to offshoring should have more favorable employment effects in firms that have already offshored
more service. This prediction follows intuitively from the original trade in tasks model by Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008), and it is formally derived in recent extensions of their model with heterogeneous
firms by Egger et al. (2015, 2016).
Panel A of the table directly tests this prediction by considering interaction terms of offshoring with
alternative measures of lagged offshoring. The first two columns show 2SLS estimates of equation (1), with
and without additional firm-level control variables, adding the one-year lag of ln service imports and an
interaction term of this lag with the contemporaneous ln service imports. Excluded instruments are ln IV
and the interaction between ln IV and the lag of ln service imports. In both specifications, the interaction
term is positive and (at least weakly) significant, substantiating the idea that the employment effects increase
in the lagged level of service offshoring.
Columns 3 and 4 of panel A take a closer look at the distribution of initial service imports. For this
purpose, I define four dummy variables indicating quartiles of the firm distribution of lagged imports (Q1 
Q4 in the table), which are included and interacted with ln service imports. These interaction terms are
instrumented by interactions of the quartile dummies with ln IV . The estimation results in the full sample
reveal employment effects of service offshoring that are monotonically increasing in lagged offshoring. The
specification with additional control variables shows no significant effect in the bottom quartile, positive
effects of similar magnitude in the second and third quartiles, and the highest point estimate in the top
quartile. In both specifications, the employment effect is significantly greater in the top compared to the
bottom quartile by a factor of two to four. These estimates suggest that the employment effects of service
offshoring are small at low initial levels of imports, and they increase in the value of services that have
already been offshored. This is exactly the pattern expected based on the productivity effect of offshoring
from the trade in tasks model. A higher initial level of offshoring implies greater cost saving and hence
more beneficial employment effects from a positive shock to foreign service exports, as captured by the IV.
The estimates in columns 3 and 4 of panel A provide strong support for this theoretical prediction.
The fact that the estimated employment effects in column 4 of Table 6 are not strictly monotonic around
the middle of the lagged service imports distribution raises the question of appropriate measurement. In
particular, a given value of service imports may correspond to very different shares of employment in large
compared to small firms. Hence, an alternative measure of lagged service imports scaled by firm size may
be better able to capture a firm’s initial exposure to offshoring cost shocks (and hence the relevance of the
productivity effect). Columns 5 and 6 of panel A repeat the previous exercise, but in this case, the dummy
variables Q1   Q4 distinguish quartiles of the distribution of lagged service importsturnover . The resulting point esti-
mates for the interaction terms increase monotonically in both specifications, with firms in higher quartiles
experiencing greater employment gains from service offshoring. Note that the 2SLS estimates in columns 3-
6 each require four first-stage regressions for the four endogenous interaction terms. Nevertheless, in all of
these estimations, the instruments are strong as evidenced by high Wald rk F-statistics for the cluster-robust
rank test proposed by Kleibergen and Paap (2006), which seem reassuringly high compared to conventional
thresholds for weak IV tests (see Stock and Yogo, 2005), with the minor exception of column 4.
Panel B of Table 6 takes an alternative view on firm heterogeneity in the employment effect of off-
shoring by distinguishing firms in terms of their productivity. Firm productivity is the key determinant of
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Table 6: Heterogeneous employment effects by lagged offshoring and firm productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Interactions with lagged offshoring
Lag ln service imports Quartiles of lag imports Quartiles of lag importsturnover
ln service imports 0.0379** 0.0278 0.0502***
(0.0173) (0.0171) (0.00980)
ln service imports ⇥ lag ln service imports 0.00622** 0.00451*
(0.00243) (0.00259)
lag ln service imports -0.0566*** -0.0385**
(0.0182) (0.0185)
Q1 ⇥ ln service imports 0.0518*** 0.0215 0.0461***
(0.0143) (0.0131) (0.00979)
Q2 ⇥ ln service imports 0.0568*** 0.0679*** 0.0261** 0.0563***
(0.0146) (0.0161) (0.0107) (0.0120)
Q3 ⇥ ln service imports 0.0919*** 0.0678*** 0.0407*** 0.0617***
(0.0216) (0.0259) (0.0124) (0.0132)
Q4 ⇥ ln service imports 0.136*** 0.0841** 0.0661*** 0.0730***
(0.0249) (0.0369) (0.0171) (0.0172)
Q2 -0.0409 -0.280** -0.190*** -0.0813
(0.124) (0.129) (0.0677) (0.0761)
Q3 -0.294* -0.294 -0.306*** -0.132
(0.179) (0.205) (0.0838) (0.0935)
Q4 -0.700*** -0.452 -0.533*** -0.227*
(0.221) (0.312) (0.129) (0.135)
Additional controls no yes no yes no yes
Observations 39,939 14,313 40,905 14,785 40,905 14,785
F-statistic (Kleibergen-Paap) 605.6 227.8 180.0 18.23 230.9 90.06
B. Interactions with productivity
Lag LP High vs. low LP High vs. low TFP
ln service imports -0.0683 -0.168** 0.0479*** 0.0384*** 0.0454*** 0.0408***
(0.0938) (0.0720) (0.0108) (0.00884) (0.00919) (0.00835)
ln service imports ⇥ lag ln LP 0.0244 0.0443***
(0.0191) (0.0151)
lag ln LP -0.462*** -0.580***
(0.134) (0.116)
ln service imports ⇥ high productivity 0.0203* 0.0598*** 0.0596*** 0.0536***
(0.0108) (0.00916) (0.0106) (0.00964)
high productivity -0.277*** -0.257*** -0.197*** -0.164***
(0.0772) (0.0601) (0.0608) (0.0538)
Additional controls no yes no yes no yes
Observations 16,880 14,775 16,718 14,233 15,059 13,831
F-statistic (Kleibergen-Paap) 227.6 193.5 322.9 257.3 284.6 252.0
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (1) with ln employment as the dependent variable, including additional interaction
terms as regressors. In panel A, Q1 Q4 denote dummy variables indicating quartiles of lagged service imports (columns 3-4)
or of lagged service importsturnover (columns 5-6), respectively. In panel B, high productivity is a dummy variable indicating above-median
LP (TFP) in columns 3-4 (columns 5-6). All regressions control for the basic set of lagged firm control variables and fixed effects
by firm and by industry-year. The even columns further account for the additional firm-level control variables from column 4
of Table 4. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms. Asterisks
indicate significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: RDSC of the Deutsche Bundesbank, SITS, MiDi, and
USTAN, 2001-2013, own calculations.
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firms’ offshoring activities in models featuring heterogeneous firms (such as Egger et al., 2016). Since more
productive firms engage more actively in offshoring, they can be expected to experience stronger produc-
tivity effects and hence greater employment gains by the same mechanism as discussed above. Panel B
provides empirical evidence in line with this conjecture. The regressions presented here are based on equa-
tion (1) augmented by an interaction term between ln service imports and three alternative proxies for firm
productivity (as well as the productivity variable itself). Both ln service imports and the interaction term are
instrumented by ln IV and an interaction of ln IV with the same productivity variable.
Columns 1-2 of panel B start by differentiating the effects of service offshoring by labor productivity,
continuously measured as the one-year lag of lnLP . The 2SLS regressions yield negative estimates of
ln service imports and positive estimates of the interaction effect, which are however only significant after
including additional control variables. These results indicate that the marginal effect of service offshoring is
zero or even negative for very unproductive firms and increases in labor productivity. To allow for non-linear
effects, I proceed by considering alternatively dummy variables indicating above-median productivity by in-
dustry and year in terms of LP (columns 3-4) or TFP (columns 5-6). For both measures, the interaction term
of service offshoring with the high productivity dummy is always positive and (at least weakly) significant in
both specifications of the 2SLS regression. The estimated interaction effects in columns 4-6 further suggest
that the elasticity for firms with above-median productivity is more than twice as large compared to firms
with a productivity below the industry median. As expected, more productive firms experience larger em-
ployment effects from service offshoring. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics well above the standard critical
values indicate strong instruments in all regressions in panel B. Overall, the estimates presented in Table 6
describe an empirical pattern of firm heterogeneity that is fully in line with the employment effects being
driven by the productivity effect of offshoring.
5.5 Deeper analysis of employment effects
This section provides deeper investigations into three interesting aspects of the employment effects at the
intensive margin of service offshoring by further exploiting the rich available micro data. First, to shed some
light on the role of supplier substitution in the domestic economy, the employment effects are distinguished
by sector (services vs. other), and service imports are considered relative to total purchases (from domestic
and foreign suppliers). Second, service offshoring is split up by OECD and non-OECD source countries
to examine differences in offshoring to high-income vs. low-income countries. Third, the section analyzes
specifically the service offshoring activities of firms with multinational investment links to characterize the
effects of potential intra-firm service offshoring.
In principle, an increase in service imports may reflect one of three cases: It may (i) substitute for activi-
ties previously done within the firm, or (ii) substitute for activities previously purchased from other domestic
suppliers, or (iii) constitute the purchase of a service that the firm did not use at all before. Since most firms’
sourcing requirements are rather stable over time, as indicated by the persistent international sourcing pat-
terns discussed in Section 2.3, the following argument abstracts from the third possibility. Among the other
two cases, the first corresponds to a widespread understanding of service offshoring both in the general pub-
lic and among economists, and may be called ‘genuine offshoring’. The second case does not accord well
with this common definition of offshoring, but may instead be labeled ‘supplier substitution’. Since supplier
substitution does not involve any relocation of tasks previously conducted in-house, there is no reason to
believe that it should entail any negative employment effects within the firm, but instead jobs may be lost
in other domestic firms. Supplier substitution may however have beneficial productivity effects within the
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firm similar to genuine offshoring, provided that the same services are delivered from abroad at a lower
cost. Hence, the possibility that service imports reflect supplier substitution rather than genuine offhoring
implies a risk of overstating the employment effects of genuine service offshoring, which is the main subject
of this paper. While supplier substitution may be of interest in itself, the available data do not allow for a
comprehensive assessment of its employment effects since domestic service providers cannot be identified.
However, information on firms’ sector affiliations and their total purchases can be exploited to gauge the
relevance of supplier substitution for the positive employment effects of service offshoring identified above.
Panel A of Table 7 uses firms’ sector affiliations to provide indicative evidence that supplier substitution
is not the driving force behind the positive employment effects. It starts by splitting the sample into firms in
the primary and industrial sectors (columns 1 and 2) and those in the service sector (columns 3 and 4). Since
service sector firms by definition deliver some services themselves, it seems more likely that their service
imports substitute for activities that could in principle be delivered within the firm. Hence, in comparison
to firms in the primary and industrial sectors, it seems likely that a larger part of service imports by service
sector firms represents genuine offshoring. Furthermore, to the extent that genuine offshoring may have less
favorable effects than supplier substitution, the estimated employment effect of service offshoring should be
lower in service sector firms. In contrast to this logic, the sectoral sample split reveals that the employment
effects are in fact greater for service sector firms compared to the primary and industrial sectors in both
specifications.27 While these sectoral differences may have a variety of explanations, they do not suggest
that the employment effects of genuine offshoring are overstated due to supplier substitution.
The last two columns of panel A take the previous approach one step further by applying a narrow defi-
nition of offshoring along the lines of Feenstra and Hanson (1999). As in the OLS regressions of Section 3.2,
narrow offshoring is defined as imports in the service type corresponding to the firm’s own industry. For in-
stance, imports of IT services by a software firm qualify as narrow offshoring, but imports of IT services by
a consultancy or a manufacturer do not. The idea behind this definition is that imports within the firm’s own
industry are more likely to represent activities that could be done by the firm itself, and hence reflect more
narrowly the common understanding of genuine offshoring (rather than supplier substitution). As noted
earlier, this approach reduces the estimation sample to the few service sector firms which import in several
years the same type of service as they deliver. Interestingly, the estimated elasticity is even much higher for
narrow offshoring (instrumented by ln IV ) compared to the broad definition in the largest available sample
from MiDi and USTAN (column 5). The estimate is rendered insignificant and the IV is much weaker in the
specification with additional firm control variables (column 6), however, the point estimate remains positive
also in this small sample. These regressions reveal that even for a narrow definition of service offshoring
the employment effects are non-negative.
Panel B presents an alternative approach to disentangling the effect of genuine service offshoring from
that of supplier substitution. The regressions reported in the first four columns split the sample into firms
that experienced a contemporaneous increase in their service import share, defined as the ratio of service
imports over ‘other operating charges’, and those for which it decreased. The item ‘other operating charges’
from the firm’s profit and loss account in USTAN includes (a large part of the) expenses on both domestic
and foreign purchases of services. Hence, firms increasing their import share are likely to import services
that they did not purchase domestically before, representing genuine offshoring. The estimates reported
in columns 1 and 2 confirm that service offshoring had a significantly positive effect on employment in
these firms. Columns 3 and 4 further reveal that higher service imports also increased employment in
27This observation is in line with the correlation patterns found by Hijzen et al. (2011) across UK sectors.
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firms with a contemporaneous decrease in their import shares, and the effect has a similar magnitude in
such firms. These regressions reveal that service offshoring has boosted firm employment regardless of
contemporaneous changes in domestic sourcing activities. The last two columns in panel B employ ln
service import share as an explanatory variable (instrumented by ln IV ) in equation (1) and confirm the
positive employment effects also for this relative service offshoring measure. Overall, the results in panels A
and B suggest that supplier substitution effects cannot explain the key finding of employment gains from
increased service offshoring.
Panel C of Table 7 investigates differences in the employment effects of service offshoring to different
countries. Since the existing literature has found the employment and wage effects of offshoring in the US
to differ between high-income and low-income source countries (Harrison and McMillan, 2011; Ebenstein
et al., 2014), imports are broadly split up into OECD and non-OECD countries. Since the other commercial
services examined in this paper often involve high-skill intensive tasks, this analysis may reveal interesting
differences compared to offshoring of manufactured inputs, which are typically thought of as low-skill
intensive. The data show that the majority of service offshoring by German firms is to OECD countries,
both in terms of the number of firms and in terms of the value of imports. This observation is not surprising
given the high skill abundance of the European OECD member countries surrounding Germany and the fact
that the gravity equation provides a good description of trade in services (Kimura and Lee, 2006).
The analysis in panel C of the table starts by considering separately service imports from OECD
(columns 1 and 2) and non-OECD countries (columns 3 and 4) as service offshoring variables in equa-
tion (1). Each of these endogenous variables is instrumented by an IV constructed as described in equa-
tion (4), including only trade with OECD or non-OECD partner countries c, respectively. The 2SLS esti-
mates identify positive employment effects of offshoring to both country groups across all specifications.
They further suggest that offshoring to non-OECD countries benefits domestic employment in German firms
more strongly. Since the IVs rely on time variation, including both OECD and non-OECD imports in the
regressions (columns 5 and 6) reduces the sample size substantially and results in only marginally strong
IVs. The point estimates in these regressions are positive but imprecisely estimated and only significant
for offshoring to non-OECD countries in the larger sample. Overall, the results of panel C suggest that
service offshoring to low-income countries, though less prevalent among German firms, entails stronger
positive employment effects than offshoring to OECD countries. This finding seems to indicate a higher
complementarity between German firms’ domestic workforce and their imports from low-income countries
as opposed to high-income countries. It is in line with the expectation that relatively low skill-intensive
commercial services imported from non-OECD countries are more likely to complement high-skilled em-
ployment in German firms. These conclusions contrast with those obtained for offshoring of manufactured
inputs by US MNEs in Harrison and McMillan (2011) and Ebenstein et al. (2014), who find that offshoring
to high-income countries complements, while offshoring to low-income countries substitutes for domestic
employment in US MNEs. The evidence for service offshoring in Germany suggests a reversed pattern and
generally more favorable employment effects.
To what extent is service offshoring conducted via intra-firm service trade within multinational firms’
boundaries or through international outsourcing? The MiDi data, covering all German inward and outward
FDI (above a low reporting threshold), can be exploited to provide a tentative answer to this question. These
data also serve to relate the findings in this paper to the literature that has exclusively focused on the foreign
activities of MNEs for measuring offshoring. To approach this question, I apply two definitions of intra-
firm service offshoring. First, I classify firms’ service imports in all countries and service types in which
25
Table 7: Deeper analysis of employment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Sector split and narrow offshoring
Non-service sectors Service sector Narrow offshoring
ln service imports 0.0540*** 0.0333*** 0.0826*** 0.0524***
(0.00755) (0.00755) (0.0166) (0.0193)
ln narrow offshoring 0.169*** 0.0444
(0.0313) (0.0546)
Additional controls no yes no yes no yes
Observations 23,818 10,822 16,840 3,880 6,351 1,056
F-statistic (Kleibergen-Paap) 912.0 412.7 441.9 114.8 110.9 14.59
B. Imports relative to domestic purchases
Increasing import share Decreasing import share Continuous import share
ln service imports 0.0610*** 0.0617*** 0.0611*** 0.0461***
(0.0158) (0.0138) (0.0122) (0.0104)
ln service import share 0.0574*** 0.0472***
(0.0102) (0.00868)
Additional controls no yes no yes no yes
Observations 7,770 6,768 6,965 6,041 16,698 14,215
F-statistic (Kleibergen-Paap) 236.4 204.0 378.5 287.6 587.1 480.2
C. Effects by source country of imports
OECD Non-OECD OECD and non-OECD
ln service imports OECD 0.0650*** 0.0460*** 0.00666 0.0297
(0.00899) (0.00901) (0.0428) (0.0495)
ln service imports non-OECD 0.107*** 0.0547*** 0.140** 0.0644
(0.0282) (0.0197) (0.0686) (0.0479)
Additional controls no yes no yes no yes
Observations 35,068 12,264 10,811 4,765 8,140 3,413
F-statistic (Kleibergen-Paap) 1291.2 502.9 112.0 67.79 17.35 7.092
D. Intra-firm imports and service count
FDI by country-service type FDI by country Service count by country
ln intra-firm offshoring 0.291*** 0.0258 0.184*** 0.0326
(0.0875) (0.0676) (0.0432) (0.0862)
# country-service types 0.00851*** 0.00484***
(0.000929) (0.00107)
Additional controls no yes no yes no yes
Observations 5,388 1,063 5,388 1,063 47,970 17,014
F-statistic (Kleibergen-Paap) 18.24 13.24 135.6 20.77 946.3 445.3
Note: The table reports 2SLS estimates of equation (1) with ln employment as the dependent variable. All regressions
control for the basic set of lagged firm control variables and fixed effects by firm and by industry-year. The even columns
further account for the additional firm-level control variables from column 4 of Table 4. In panel A, columns 1-2 restrict
the sample to non-service sectors (NACE codes <45), columns 3-4 restrict it to the service sector (NACE codes  45),
and columns 5-6 consider only narrow offshoring of services corresponding to the firm’s own industry. In panel B,
columns 1-2 restrict the sample to firms with an increasing import share, columns 3 and 4 restrict it to firms with a
decreasing import share, and columns 5-6 consider the import share as an explanatory variable. Panel C distinguishes
service offshoring to OECD and non-OECD countries. In panel D, columns 1-2 consider intra-firm service offshoring
defined as imports from a country-service type combination where the firm has a foreign affiliate or parent, columns 3-
4 consider intra-firm service offshoring more broadly defined as imports from a country where the firm has a foreign
affiliate or parent, and columns 5-6 examine the number of country-service type combinations as an explanatory variable.
Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within firms. Asterisks
indicate significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: RDSC of the Deutsche Bundesbank, SITS,
MiDi, and USTAN, 2001-2013, own calculations.
26
they also have a foreign affiliate or parent (according to MiDi) as intra-firm service offshoring. Second, I
drop the service type requirement and include in the definition all service imports from a country where the
firm reports any foreign investment link, to allow for the possibility that a related party active in a different
industry also provides services. Both definitions overstate the amount of actual intra-firm offshoring. The
second definition furthermore provides an upper bound for the relevance of this phenomenon, since the
existence of a related party in the source country of service imports is a necessary condition for intra-firm
trade. Based on these considerations, the data allow for the conclusion that intra-firm service offshoring is
of limited relevance, as only 1,076 firms in the full estimation sample satisfy this necessary condition and
may potentially engage in intra-firm service offshoring.
Panel D of Table 7 reports 2SLS estimates of regressions including the two alternative definitions of
intra-firm service offshoring (instrumented by ln IV ) in equation (1). Whether restricting the definition to
countries and service types in which related parties are present (columns 1 and 2) or more broadly to FDI
partner countries (columns 3 and 4), the employment effects are estimated to be positive, and significantly
so in the larger sample. The estimates in the smaller sample with additional control variables are based on
only 205 firms and imprecise due to a rather weak IV. Overall, this analysis suggests that intra-firm service
offshoring plays a negligible role in Germany, where services are typically imported at arm’s length.28
Hence, datasets restricted only to MNEs do not seem suitable for investigating service offshoring, as they
are likely to miss the bulk of relevant activity. Irrespective of the organizational mode, increases in service
offshoring tend to have positive effects on domestic firm employment.
Finally, the last two columns in panel D reexamine a measure of the extensive margin of service off-
shoring to estimate the effect of adding another service type from the same country to the offshoring port-
folio. At this level of disaggregation, the number of country-service type combinations in which the firm
conducts offshoring can be instrumented by an IV similar to the main instrument from equation (4). The IV
is the world export supply by partner country c and year t, weighted by the firm’s pre-sample import shares.
Compared to the main instrument, this approach ignores the variation across service types, so it is valid only
under somewhat more restrictive assumptions, but it allows for investigating one dimension of the extensive
margin of service offshoring by the same means as the intensive margin. The 2SLS estimates confirm the
positive employment effects also for this measure of service offshoring, and they are also larger than the
corresponding FE estimates.
5.6 Sample selection
Two margins of selection are relevant for the main analysis of the employment effects at the intensive
margin of service trade. First, since information on employment (and other covariates) is only available for
the firms reporting to MiDi or USTAN, there may be sample selection into these databases. Second, firms
select into the service offshoring activity, as discussed in detail in Section 4. To the extent that these margins
of selection are non-random and their determinants are correlated with the error term "i,t in equation (1),
they may bias the estimates of   in the previous analysis at the intensive margin. Therefore, both of these
selection issues are addressed in turn.
To correct for possible sample selection bias in the panel, I follow the method proposed by Wooldridge
(2010).29 It involves estimating probit selection equations à la Heckman (1979) year by year and includ-
28Note that all the results in this study are restricted to services delivered via cross-border trade or movement of natural persons
in the sense of GATS modes 1, 2, and 4. Service imports via commercial presence (GATS mode 3) are not captured, as they involve
domestic transactions between the foreign affiliate and a service provider within the foreign country.
29See also Harrison and McMillan (2011) for an application in the offshoring context.
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ing the inverse Mills ratios IMRi,t predicted by these equations, interacted with year dummies  t, in the
following first-differenced (FD) version of equation (1):
  ln employmenti,t =   ·  ln service importsi,t + · Xi,t 1 + ⇢ ·  t ⇥ IMRi,t +  j,t + ⌫i,t. (5)
In this equation,   denotes the FD operator (so  Y ⌘ Yi,t   Yi,t 1 for any variable Y ) that takes care of
firm-specific effects,  ,  , and ⇢ denote the parameters to be estimated,  j,t are industry-year fixed effects,
and ⌫i,t is the error term. The model is estimated by 2SLS, instrumenting for   ln service importsi,t by
  ln IVi,t, and standard errors are bootstrapped (based on 200 replications) to account for the generated
regressors IMRi,t, of which there are two sets.
First, to correct for selection into the sample, the annual selection equations explain a dummy variable
for whether the observation is included in the full estimation sample in column 1 of Table 4. They include as
explanatory variables a set of dummy variables indicating whether the firm was a service importer, service
exporter, MNE, or FIE, and whether it reported to USTAN in the previous year, as well as industry fixed ef-
fects. These variables are pre-determined, well defined for all observations in the panel, and they are related
to selection into the three underlying databases. The motivation for including these explanatory variables is
that firms typically show high persistence in their trading status, FDI links, and reporting behavior, so these
lagged variables can partly predict future appearance in the sample. The estimates are used to compute the
first set of IMR terms.
Second, to correct for selection into the service offshoring activity, a service importer dummy is ex-
plained in annual cross-sections by the same variablesMi,t 1 which have been identified as relevant predic-
tors of the extensive margin of offshoring in Section 4. The predicted values are used to compute the second
set of IMR terms. This twofold approach to correct for selection exploits the fact that the three underlying
data sources are overlapping in terms of their firm coverage. Due to this feature of the data, different sets
of firms are used to estimate the different first-stage equations for selection into the sample and selection
into the service offshoring activity. In the absence of useful exclusion restrictions, the selection models are
identified by assuming joint normality of the error terms in the selection equations and ⌫i,t.
Table 8: First differencing and correcting for sample selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
First differencing Sample selection Offshoring selection Both selection margins
  ln service imports 0.0354*** 0.0307*** 0.0428*** 0.0360*** 0.0429*** 0.0360*** 0.0428*** 0.0358***
(0.00767) (0.00912) (0.00748) (0.00694) (0.00715) (0.00726) (0.00794) (0.00743)
Additional controls no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 32,356 11,473 32,356 11,473 32,360 11,477 32,356 11,473
 2 IMR 20.88 18.78 21.24 21.17
Note: The table reports 2SLS estimates of equation (5) with   ln employment as the dependent variable. All regressions
control for the basic set of lagged firm control variables and fixed effects by firm and by industry-year. The even columns
further account for the additional firm-level control variables from column 4 of Table 4 (in first differences). The first
two columns report estimates of the simple FD model, columns 3-4 correct for selection into the estimation sample by
adding interaction terms  t ⇥ IMRi,t, columns 5-6 analogously correct for selection into service offshoring status, and
columns 7-8 correct for both selection margins. The  2 IMR statistic refers to a test for joint significance of the interaction
terms  t ⇥ IMRi,t. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within
firms in columns 1-2 and bootstrapped based on 200 replications in columns 3-8. Asterisks indicate significance levels:
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: RDSC of the Deutsche Bundesbank, SITS, MiDi, and USTAN, 2001-2013,
own calculations.
Table 8 reports the results of estimating equation (5) for the two specifications with and without the
additional firm-level control variables from column 4 of Table 4. It starts in columns 1 and 2 by estimating
the FD model in equation (5) without any IMR terms. The strength of the IV is confirmed and the estimated
effect of service offshoring on employment is positive and highly significant in the FD model. However,
the estimates of   are smaller compared to the main FE estimates of  . This result seems plausible pro-
vided that some of the employment gains from service offshoring take more than one year to materialize,
and are hence not captured by the FD model.30 In columns 3 and 4, the interaction terms  t ⇥ IMRi,t
for t = {2002, . . . , 2013} are added to the FD model in order to correct for selection into the dataset.
Columns 5 and 6 proceed analogously for selection into service offshoring, and columns 7 and 8 include
all 24 interaction terms to correct for both margins of selection. The  2 statistics from tests of joint sig-
nificance of the  t ⇥ IMRi,t terms suggest that both selection margins are only marginally relevant for
explaining changes in firm employment, and only few of the interaction terms are individually significant
(not reported). The estimated employment effect of service offshoring is positive and significant in all of the
regressions correcting for selection.
5.7 Dynamic labor demand
The analysis in this paper, as well as most of the existing international economics literature investigating the
employment effects of offshoring, has so far abstracted from dynamic aspects of labor demand.31 In practice,
however, firm employment may depend on its past realizations due to adjustment costs (Hamermesh, 1993),
such as search costs, notice periods, and severance pay. To take these aspects into account, equation (1) is
modified in this section to include lagged employment as an additional explanatory variable. Estimating such
a dynamic model poses the well-known challenge that lagged employment is likely to be correlated with
unobserved firm characteristics, which causes dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981) and calls for a generalized
methods of moments (GMM) approach (Hansen, 1982). This challenge is addressed below by applying
the difference GMM estimator, which exploits longer lags of the endogenous variable along with lags of
the exogenous regressors as instruments in the FD model. The difference GMM estimator was originally
proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and is best known as the Arellano-Bond estimator, named after the
contribution by Arellano and Bond (1991). This estimator is well-established as a tool for consistently
estimating dynamic labor demand equations, and its one-step version is implemented in this paper by the
Stata command xtabond2 (Roodman, 2009).
Table 9 reports the results of estimating the dynamic panel data models. The first column starts by
adding the lagged dependent variable to the standard specification of equation (1), including only the basic
set of firm-level control variables, and estimating this model by 2SLS in the sample pooled over all years
(treating the firm fixed effect as random). This naïve pooled 2SLS estimator is subject to the Nickell bias.
In particular, it is well-known that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in this model is biased
upward. The estimates reported in the second column apply the within-transformation to the same model,
resulting in the 2SLS-FE estimator (used in most of the previous analysis). Note that the estimates in
column 2 are still biased since the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term also in the
within-transformed model. In particular, the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable can be
expected to be biased downward. Hence, the two estimates 0.961 and 0.583 provide approximate upper and
lower bounds to the true effect of lagged employment.
30Note that the within-transformed (FE) model is preferred precisely because the IV has been designed to capture medium-to-
long-term changes in service offshoring (see the discussion in Hummels et al., 2014).
31Two notable exceptions are Görg and Hanley (2005) and Lo Turco and Maggioni (2012).
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Table 9: Dynamic labor demand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled 2SLS 2SLS-FE Difference GMM
ln service imports 0.0192*** 0.0491*** 0.0387*** 0.0209*** 0.0203***
(0.00285) (0.00610) (0.00775) (0.00699) (0.00639)
lag ln employment 0.961*** 0.583*** 0.606*** 0.722*** 0.349***
(0.00334) (0.0170) (0.0913) (0.183) (0.118)
ln wage -0.590***
(0.0849)
Additional controls no no no yes yes
Observations 43,057 40,717 32,246 11,538 11,148
p-value of AR1 test 0.000 0.001 0.005
p-value of AR2 test 0.242 0.586 0.235
p-value of Hansen test 0.133 0.000 0.000
Note: The table reports estimates of equation (1) with ln employment as the dependent variable, in-
cluding the lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor. All regressions control for the basic
set of lagged firm control variables and fixed effects by firm and by industry-year. Columns 4-5 further
account for the additional firm-level control variables from column 4 of Table 4. Column 1 uses the
2SLS estimator in the pooled sample and column 2 uses the 2SLS estimator in the within-transformed
model. Columns 3-5 employ the one-step difference GMM estimator, using all available higher-order
lags of the exogenous regressors and of the dependent variable as well as ln IV as instruments in the
first-differenced model. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation within firms. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Source: RDSC of the Deutsche Bundesbank, SITS, MiDi, and USTAN, 2001-2013, own calculations.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 report difference GMM estimates of the dynamic model, which use the
second lag and all available higher-order lags of the dependent variable, all lags of the exogenous variables,
as well as ln IV as instruments in the FD model. The regression in column 3 includes the basic set of control
variables as before, while column 4 includes the additional firm-level control variables. Conditional on the
validity of these instruments, the difference GMM approach yields consistent estimates of the parameters
of interest. The resulting estimates for the employment effect of service offshoring are positive and highly
significant in both specifications. Again, the point estimates are smaller than in the main analysis, as was
the case for the FD estimates reported in Table 8. The final column includes as an additional regressor
the firm-level wage per employee lnwage, which is treated as endogenous and similarly instrumented by
all available lags. Adding this regressor does not change the estimated effect of service offshoring and
yields a plausible estimate for the wage elasticity well within the range typically found in the literature
(see e.g. Lichter et al., 2015). These exercises further validate the approach and ensure that the positive
effects of service offshoring identified above cannot be explained by dynamic panel bias in labor demand or
endogeneity in firm-level wages.
A number of standard plausibility checks support the validity of the difference GMM estimates. First, the
estimated coefficient of lagged employment of 0.606 in column 3 lies in the plausible range identified by the
corresponding pooled 2SLS and 2SLS-FE regressions. Second, in all the estimations reported in columns 3-
5, the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation of order one (AR1) is rejected at the 1% significance
level, whereas the test for zero autocorrelation of order two (AR2) cannot be rejected. Third, the Hansen J
test (obtained from a consistent two-step estimate) is rejected at any conventional significance level for the
regression reported in column 3, suggesting that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. However, it cannot
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be rejected for the estimations including additional control variables (columns 4 and 5).32 Overall, these
regression diagnostics suggest that the difference GMM approach seems suitable to estimate the dynamic
model, which supports the main conclusions of the previous analysis.
5.8 Robustness checks
Table 10 explores the robustness of the estimated employment effects at the intensive margin of service
offshoring to addressing various concerns that might challenge the exclusion restriction of the IV. As before,
the estimates in this table are based on the main specification of equation (1) with and without additional
firm control variables, corresponding to columns 1 and 4 of Table 4.
An important assumption underlying the IV approach is that the time variation in the export supply of
partner countries to the rest of the world reflects supply-side shocks. In particular, the exclusion restric-
tion requires that world export supply (WES) may not be correlated with demand shocks in German firms
(conditional on the covariates). In general, this assumption seems plausible, since the estimation is imple-
mented at the highly disaggregate level of individual firms, Germany itself is excluded from WES in the IV
construction, and all specifications control for industry-year fixed effects absorbing industry-wide demand
shocks. There might, however, be a slight possibility that the assumption is violated through reverse causal-
ity if a very large German firm is a significant buyer of a particular service type in the world market, and
thereby affects demand by other countries. To eliminate this possibility, the robustness checks summarized
in columns 1 and 2 of panel A exclude from the sample all firms whose service imports make up more than
0.1% of the partner country’s exports to the rest of the world in a given service type and year (according to
Comtrade). The employment effects estimated in this sample are almost identical to the baseline estimates
for both specifications, which ameliorates any concerns related to reverse causality.33
Another possible threat to the exclusion restriction might lie in German demand shocks that are corre-
lated with demand shocks in other countries, which affect the time variation in WES. If such shocks are
not perfectly captured by industry-year fixed effects in the regressions, they might impair the validity of the
IV. To mitigate this concern, an alternative variant of the IV is constructed by restricting the set of desti-
nation countries for partner countries’ export supply in equation (4) to a few countries that are comparable
to Germany but not subject to the same demand shocks. To be precise, the set of destination countries for
the construction of this IV is restricted to eight non-neighboring, non-Eurozone countries with an average
income level similar to Germany, following Dauth et al. (2014).34 Since not all partner countries export ser-
vices to these eight countries in several years, using the alternative IV reduces the sample size. Nevertheless,
the estimates reported in columns 3 and 4 of panel A are almost identical to the main estimation results.
The third set of robustness checks presented in Table 10 addresses an issue related to missing data for
aggregate service trade flows. Unfortunately, the availability of service trade data lags behind the standard
for goods trade (see e.g. Francois and Hoekman, 2010). Due to imperfect coverage, aggregate service
trade data in Comtrade are missing for some country-service type-year observations despite positive imports
reported by German firms in SITS. Since the IV defined in equation (4) is constructed as a weighted sum of
aggregate trade flows, this issue induces measurement error in the IV. To address this problem, an alternative
32Note that “the validity of the overidentifying restrictions is neither sufficient nor necessary for the validity of the moment
condition” (Parente and Silva, 2012, p. 314), but should rather be viewed as a test for whether the instruments coherently identify
the same parameters.
33Similar conclusions are obtained when large firms are excluded by alternative criteria, e.g. firms that account for more than
0.01% of aggregate German service imports in a given year, or firms whose real turnover exceeds e 5 billion (in values of 2010).
34The eight destination countries are: Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Singapore, and the UK.
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variant of the IV is constructed, which uses only data on the country-service type combinations for which
aggregate trade data are available in all of the years 2001-2013. While this IV can explain only a smaller
share of the time variation in firms’ service offshoring, it does not vary due to missing aggregate data.
Columns 5 and 6 of panel A show that 2SLS regressions relying on the alternative IV yield even larger point
estimates for the employment effect of service offshoring compared to the main analysis.
Table 10: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Excluding large firms and using alternative IVs
Excluding large importers IV based on 8 countries IV data in all years
ln service imports 0.0719*** 0.0492*** 0.0783*** 0.0500*** 0.117*** 0.0688***
(0.00861) (0.00828) (0.0114) (0.0132) (0.0181) (0.0183)
Additional controls no yes no yes no yes
Observations 40,401 14,626 30,952 11,270 21,112 7,302
F-statistic (Kleibergen-Paap) 1,399.3 548.1 714.6 280.1 452.1 122.6
B. Considering service exports and size effects
Imports and exports Only exports Size-industry-year FE
ln service imports 0.0963 0.0792 0.0657*** 0.0357***
(0.0708) (0.0529) (0.00848) (0.00787)
ln service exports 0.00971 -0.0190 0.119*** 0.0483**
(0.0749) (0.0471) (0.0206) (0.0196)
Additional controls no yes no yes no yes
Observations 13,315 3,898 17,524 5,173 30,121 12,464
F-statistic (Kleibergen-Paap) 5.232 5.925 210.7 60.05 1,048.3 449.9
Note: The table reports 2SLS estimates of equation (1) with ln employment as the dependent variable. All regres-
sions control for the basic set of lagged firm control variables and fixed effects by firm and by industry-year. The
even columns further account for the additional firm-level control variables from column 4 of Table 4. In panel A,
columns 1-2 restrict the sample by excluding large firms that account for more than 0.1% of a given country’s
service exports by service type and year, columns 3-4 use a variant of the IV based on eight industrialized desti-
nation countries, and columns 5-6 use a variant of the IV based only on the country-service type combinations for
which aggregate service trade data is available in all of the years 2001-2013. In panel B, columns 1-4 consider
instrumented service exports, and columns 5-6 include a full set of fixed effects for all combinations of industry,
size group, and year. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
within firms. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: RDSC of the
Deutsche Bundesbank, SITS, MiDi, and USTAN, 2001-2013, own calculations.
Panel B of Table 10 addresses the concern that service exporting activity, similar to offshoring, can
also affect firm employment, and it may similarly be endogenous to employment. For this reason, the
estimations of Hummels et al. (2014) include as an additional explanatory variable firms’ goods exports, for
which they construct instruments in analogy to the import side. I apply a similar approach to service trade
in Germany by including the log of firm-level service exports in equation (1) and instrumenting this variable
by the weighted world import demand by partner countries and service types, constructed in analogy to
the IV in equation (4). As shown in columns 1 and 2 of panel B, the resulting point estimates for the
effect of service imports are positive and greater than in the main specifications without service exports.
However, these estimates are very imprecisely estimated and not reliable, since the hypothesis of weak
instruments cannot be rejected at standard critical values based on the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics of 5-6.
The weak IV problem is caused by the need to estimate two first-stage regressions in combination with the
implied, drastic reduction of the sample to firms which import and export services in several years. Hence,
these estimates are unfortunately not informative for the true employment effects of service offshoring and
exporting. However, given the point estimates for the employment elasticity in columns 1 and 2 and the
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small number of service importing firms that also export services, it seems unlikely that the bias that might
arise from endogenous exporting behavior is of economic significance in the main estimations. In 2SLS
regressions considering only service exports (columns 3 and 4), the exporting IV is strong and the estimates
suggest that service exporting also increases domestic employment.
The final robustness check reported in Table 10 relates to the firm’s initial importing structure, which is
used to weight partner countries’ WES in the IV. In general, this importing structure may vary systematically
across different firms, for instance because larger firms have better access to more distant offshoring loca-
tions. Note that the weights in the IV are held constant based on the pre-sample importing structure to avoid
any reverse causality issues. Furthermore, any time-invariant correlates of employment and the importing
structure have been fully accounted for by the within-transformation (or first-differencing) throughout the
analysis. However, if firms with a particularly favorable initial importing structure are also inherently more
dynamic, this might threaten the validity of the IV. For instance, larger firms might be characterized by
higher employment growth rates in general and might initially offshore services to countries that subse-
quently experience particularly positive export supply shocks. In this case, the higher employment growth
of larger firms might in part be attributed to service offshoring through the IV, resulting in an upward bias
of  . To address these and related concerns, I control for a full set of time-varying fixed effects for all com-
binations of firms’ industries and size groups, defined by categories of their real turnover in the pre-sample
year.35 These fixed effects do not only control for size-group-specific employment trends, but more gener-
ally allow the size-group specific effects to vary arbitrarily across industries and over time. The estimates
reported in the last two columns of Table 10, conditional on these fixed effects, confirm the positive and
significant employment effects of service offshoring.
6 Concluding discussion
Fear of job losses in developed countries has spurred a public debate about service offshoring. The existing
literature studying this phenomenon has found small positive correlations between employment and service
offshoring, but establishing causality has remained a challenge due to endogeneity issues and the lack of
detailed micro data. To address this challenge, the paper introduces a newly combined dataset covering
almost the entire universe of German firms’ service trade over the period from 2001 to 2013. Using this
unique dataset, I conduct a comprehensive analysis of the causal effects of service offshoring (both at the
extensive and at the intensive margin) on firm employment.
The analysis demonstrates that firms which started service offshoring did not decrease their domestic
employment in the subsequent years compared to a matched control group. Instead, further increases in
service offshoring have even contributed to increasing employment within German firms, as IV regressions
reveal. These results provide strong support for the productivity effect of offshoring predicted by the canoni-
cal trade in tasks model. In line with this theory, service offshoring has also boosted output and productivity,
and the employment gains are stronger in firms with higher initial offshoring values and higher productivity.
These findings indicate several promising avenues for future research. Since the analysis in this paper
has concentrated explicitly on firm-level employment, it does not capture possible repercussions outside
the firm in the domestic economy, e.g. through supplier substitution and spillover effects. Investigating the
economy-wide impact of offshoring thus remains an important task. The robust positive employment effects
of service offshoring found in this paper obviously contrast with the less favorable effects typically found
35The eight categories are <2, 2  5, 5  10, 10  20, 20  50, 50  100, 100  500, and >500 million e in values of 2010.
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for the offshoring of manufactured inputs in other studies (notably Hummels et al., 2014, who use a very
similar methodology). A deeper investigation into the fundamental differences between these two types of
offshoring seems warranted.
What can we expect from service offshoring in the future? Estimates from the mid-2000s suggest that
around 25% of all US jobs are potentially offshorable, including many service activities that used to be
non-tradable (see Blinder, 2006, 2009; Blinder and Krueger, 2013). It also seems reasonable to expect that
the range of tradable services is going to expand further with technological progress. Therefore, the bulk
of service offshoring may yet lie ahead. In light of the results found for the past decade in Germany, the
average worker employed in a firm that considers expanding its service offshoring activities should have
little reason to worry about these future changes.
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A Appendix
A.1 Service types correspondence
Table A.1: List of Services
Service type SITS service categories Comtrade EBOPS 2002 codes
Computer & IT 513 262
Communications 518, 591 245
Insurance 400, 401, 410, 420, 440-445, 450, 451, 460 253
Financial 533 260
Construction 561, 570, 580 249
Engineering 512 280, 283
Research & development 511 279
Other business services 516, 519, 523, 530, 531, 540 274, 284, 269, 278, 272
Personnel 514, 517, 521 310
Other services 510, 534, 562, 594, 595 282, 287
The table lists the correspondence between the broad service types used in the analysis, the detailed service categories recorded
in SITS (see Biewen et al., 2013), and the Extended Balance of Payments Services (EBOPS) 2002 classification of the UN
Comtrade data.
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A.2 Consistency checks for employment
A variety of checks are implemented to validate information on firm employment, the main outcome variable
of interest in this paper. Note that reporting employment in USTAN is not mandatory, and this variable is not
crucial for the main purposes for which both MiDi and USTAN data are collected. As a result, information
on employment is missing for some firm-year observations in both datasets and the information provided
may be subject to reporting errors. Therefore, the employment variable is carefully cross-validated in three
ways. First, for firms reporting employment in both datasets, the numbers of employees can be compared.
These numbers are identical or deviate by less than 2 employees or 2% of employment in 64% of these firm-
year observations, suggesting no major measurement problems for the majority of observations. For these
firms, the employment information from USTAN is preferred to MiDi because USTAN is also the source
of the balance sheet data used in the analysis. Second, for firms that report employment only in USTAN, I
exploit for validation the total wage bill, which is reported as part of the firm’s profit and loss statement and
carefully checked by central bank staff. Outliers with a real wage per employee below e 1,200 or above
e 2.2 million in 2010 values (approximately the minimum and maximum values observed in the overlap
of USTAN and MiDi) are excluded from the analysis. Third, for firms that report employment only in
MiDi, information on the wage bill is unavailable, so I exploit data on real turnover to validate employment.
Potential outliers are excluded if the real turnover per employee is below e 1,000 or above e 10 million
in 2010 values. A stricter plausibility requirement is applied for firms with a single employee, where the
upper bound is set to e 5 million in 2010 values. For the analysis in the paper, information on turnover is
generally taken from the same data source as information on employment.
A.3 Constructing physical capital stocks
It is well-known that deflated accounting capital stocks tend to underestimate firms’ physical capital stocks
because book values, measured at historical prices, differ from current market values and accounting de-
preciation is typically higher than real depreciation for tax reasons. To construct physical capital stocks, I
therefore implement the perpetual inventory method (PIM) as described by Bachmann and Bayer (2014),
who apply the PIM to earlier years of the USTAN data.36 Since the procedure is described in detail in their
Web Appendix, the exposition here is brief, highlighting the few differences from their approach.
The PIM is implemented separately for two types of capital goods: (i) buildings and structures and (ii)
equipment and machinery. In the first step, nominal investment for each of these capital goods is inferred
from changes in the accounting capital stock and accounting depreciation. The second, main step of the PIM
starts from the the initial capital stock in the first year of a non-interrupted series of observed investments,
deflated to the year 1999 by the investment price deflator. The physical capital stock in all subsequent years
is computed by successively adding similarly deflated investments and subtracting real depreciation.37
This procedure is useful to correct the capital stock in these subsequent years, but it does not affect the
initial capital stock for each firm, which remains to be underestimated. Therefore, the initial capital stock is
iteratively adjusted by a correction factor, which measures by how much the real capital stock constructed
for later years exceeds the deflated accounting capital stock. As a minor deviation from Bachmann and
Bayer (2014), I use the median value of this correction factor by industry, which is less prone to outliers
36I am grateful to Christian Bayer for providing valuable advice and code for implementing the PIM.
37Data on the investment price indices and depreciation rates by type of capital good are obtained from the same time series
as in Bachmann and Bayer (2014), provided by the German Statistical Office. For the PIM and the subsequent estimation of
production functions, each firm is assigned a constant 2-digit NACE industry code, corresponding to the industry code it reports
most frequently in USTAN (and the latest one of these values in case of several modes).
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than the mean. The procedure is iterated in each industry until either the median correction factor falls below
1.1 or the number of rounds reaches ten. In each round, the procedure corrects for outliers in terms of the
correction factor, which may indicate unusual events at the level of the firm (such as a fire or an accident).
As a result, the physical capital stock is missing for these outliers, but the observations are nevertheless used
in the regression analysis in the paper, as long as it does not rely on the capital stock. Note that even after
implementing the PIM, the initial capital stock is imperfectly approximated. This concern is ameliorated by
the fact that the PIM is implemented using USTAN data as far back as 1999, while the main analysis in the
paper starts in 2002.
Finally, to obtain the total physical capital stock, the real stocks for both capital goods obtained from
the PIM are aggregated and added to the net present value of rented capital. The latter is constructed as the
reported value of rented capital divided by the average investment price deflator and a measure of the user
cost of capital, defined as in Bachmann and Bayer (2014).
A.4 Estimating total factor productivity
To obtain a measure of total factor productivity (TFP), Cobb-Douglas production functions are estimated
by industry using the procedure suggested by Ackerberg et al. (2015). The log-linear production functions
specify real value added as a function of the firm’s employment and the physical capital stock (constructed
by the PIM described in Appendix A.3), while using real material inputs (also deflated by the industry-level
producer price index) as a proxy variable. The estimations exploit the full available USTAN sample over
the years 1999-2013, where each firm is assigned a single 2-digit industry, and a few small industries are
grouped together to obtain a sufficient number of observations for each estimation.
At least since Olley and Pakes (1996), it is well-known that estimation of such production functions
suffers from bias due to the fact that the firm may base its input choice on the observed productivity, which
is unobserved to the econometrician. To address this issue, a control function approach à la Olley and Pakes
(1996) is implemented, which exploits material input purchases as a proxy for unobserved productivity,
as suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). This procedure assumes that material inputs are strictly
increasing in productivity, and employment is treated as a freely adjustable input, while the physical capital
stock enters as a state variable. Following the critique by Ackerberg et al. (2015), no coefficient is identified
in the first stage of this procedure, which regresses the log of value added on a third-order polynomial in
the inputs (all in logs). Instead, the labor and capital coefficients are identified in the second stage GMM
estimation by the appropriate moment conditions.
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